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PREFACE 
This study explored the predictive abilities of three models of bank 
asset portfolio behavior. The objective of the study was to find out 
which of the three models was the most accurate predictor of a banks 
asset portfolio. Four banks were studied using spectral analysis, 
Hannan's inefficient method of time series analysis, linear programming, 
quadratic programming and the root mean square error. 
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Funds flow into a bank as cash through the deposit categories. Some 
of these funds are then placed into other asset categories. This study 
is concerned with the conversion by the bank of the funds from cash to 
other asset categories, i.e., the adjustment process of the asset port-
1 folio. The study is not concerned with why a bank adjusts its asset. 
portfolio in response to an adjustment in its deposit portfolio, only 
that it does. The purpose of this study is to,compare the predictive 
abilities of different models of the adjustment process for a bank's 
asset portfolio. 
All of the models in the literature can be related to one of three 
bas.ic theories of bank asset allocation (135). The three basic theories 
of how a bank allocates its assets, i.e., adjusts to its asset portfolio, 
are pool-of-funds, asset allocation, and optimization. 
The pool-of-funds approach considers that the bank obtains its funds 
from a number of sources. The basic idea underlying this theory is that 
all funds should be placed into one large pool. Allocations are then made 
from this pool to meet the bank's demand for funds. Funds would not be 
allocated on any particular basis from the pool, i.e., no attempt is made 
1 This study is concerned with the conversions that both increase and 
decrease the deposit and asset categories. 
1 
to match the maturity of the funds used to acquire a particular asset 
with the maturity of the asset. This approach places heavy emphasis on 
b~nk liquidity and less emphasis on bank profitability. It is a result 
of the "real bills" thinking of commercial banks in the 1950s and 1960s 
(84, 114, 124, 135). 
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The asset allocation approach (135) was proposed in an attempt to 
eliminate the deficiencies of the pool-of-funds theory. This approach 
considers that the liquidity needed by the bank should be related to the 
source from which the funds came. This theory attempts to distinguish 
funds according to the velocity, i.e. , turnover, of the sources. Once 
the turnover rate of the sources is determined an attempt is made to 
match sources (liabilities) and use.s (assets) -with similar velocities, 
i.e., maturities. The main advantage of this approach is that it gives 
more consideration to bank profitability while still considering bank 
liquidity. The major disadvantage of this theory is that it fails to 
consider the importance of the minimum liability balances held by the 
bank. 
The optimization approach (2, 8, 20, 26, 28, 35, 45, 63, 77, 84, 
115, 120, 127,, 128, 130, 135, 139, 145, 148, 150), also known as the 
management science approach, gives to the bank a specific objective not 
set forth in the pool-of-funds or asset allocation approaches. In the 
literature this objective is usually profit or utility maximization. 
This approach differs from the first two in that it emphasizes the objec-
tive of bank management and not the actual adjustment process of the 
portfolio. The bank uses whatever adjustment process it wishes to 
achieve its objective. 
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Using these three approaches researchers have developed and tested 
numerous models of how a bank behaves, i.e., adjusts its asset portfolio. 
Th~ majority of the work has used the optimization approach. The question 
which needs to be answered is, which of the postulated forms of bank 
behavior, i.e., models, best describe current bank management behavior. 
The term, best, implies that there is a criterion by which all of 
these models can be judged. The criterion proposed in this study is the 
predictive ability of the models. The predictive ability of a model was 
chosen as the criterion by which the models are to be judged because if 
a model cannot predict, it has not captured all of the crucial and 
essential elements necessary to describe the process being modeled. If 
a model cannot predict, within some normal range for error, the future 
asset portfolio of a commercial bank, then it has failed to capture the 
actual adjustment process. 
This research will adjudge the question presented in the previous 
paragraph, i.e., which model is the most descriptive of bank behavior. 
The three approaches which banks may use to adjust their asset portfolio 
will be modeled and tested in their pure form. Variations of the three 
approaches, suggested in the literature (34, 35, 84), will also be 
modeled and tested. Obviously, the study's findings will also have 
implications about the validity of the three basic approaches for 
describing bank portfolio adjustments. 
This study is only concerned with the predictive ability of certain 
models of bank behavior, i.e., how a bank adjusts its asset portfolio. 
The study will not include any chance constrained or goal programming 
models of bank behavior, nor will it use multiperiod optimization models 
of the portfolio adjustment process. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to review previous studies which have 
examined the adjustment process of a bank's asset portfolio. It will 
present the reader with an overview of the previous research so that he 
can relate the current effort to work in this area. 
The research covered will be divided into three groups. Each group 
will represent a different approach to a bank's portfolio adjustment 
process. The first section of articles will consist of those studies 
which view the adjustment as an optimization problem. This theory 
postulates that a bank will adjust its asset portfolio in an attempt to 
maximize an objective which the bank is trying to achieve. It also 
assumes that the bank is limited in preserving this objective by con-
straints imposed upon it from different quarters. The majority of the 
research has been in this area. The second section presents the articles 
which consider the bank to be using a pool-of-funds view of asset adjust-
ment. This approach assumes that a bank will place all of its incoming 
funds into a pool of cash and near cash assets. Funds will then be 
drawn from this pool as they are needed by the bank. The final section 
introduces the research which states that banks adjusted their asset 
portfolio according to the asset allocation theory. This theory assumes 
that banks attempt to match the maturity structure of their assets with 
the maturity structure of their liabilities, i.e., funds flowing into 
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the bank from short-term sources will go into short-term assets and funds 
from long-term sources into long-.term assets. 
The difference between this approach and the pool-of-funds approach 
is in the initial placement of the funds flowing into the bank. Bank 
management must decide whether to place all of the incoming funds into a 
pool of cash and near-cash assets or whether to place part of the funds 
directly into longer term loans and investments. The results of the 
bank management's decision will be reflected in the time it takes the 
bank to adjust its asset portfolio, in the profitability of the bank, 
and in the bank's liquidity. 
Studies Using the Optimization Approach 
The research using this approach is divided into five subsections. 
The first is a set of introductory articles which indicate that banks 
are using the optimization approach. The remaining four subsections 
present the literature according to the objective function of the study 
under review. The second subsection presents those articles which assume 
that profit maximization is the bank's objective. The third subsection 
contains articles which postulate that the bank is attempting to maximize 
its own utility. The fourth subsection hypothesizes that wealth maxi-
mization is the objective of the bank. The final subsection presents all 
other articles which use an optimization framework but that do not have 
one of the aforementioned objective functions. All of the subsections 
will be further subdivided into single and multiperiod studies for each 
objective function. The articles in each subsection will be presented 
in chronological order. 
6 
Introductory Articles 
Anderson and Burger (5) in 1969 tested for a change in the portfolio 
behavior of commercial banks. The authors tested to see if bank behavior 
is closer to the "accomodation principle" or the "profit maximization 
principle". Using a two-stage multiple regression modei the authors 
conclude that bank portfolio behavior is closer to the profit maximization 
principle, i.e., banks had begun to be more competitive and were more 
concerned with profits and less with a "real bills" type of thinking 
prevalent in banking prior to this time. 1 
Gillespie, Hodgman and Yancey (68) view the bank as a provider of 
services and not a profit maximizer. Their view of the bank is very 
close to what Anderson and Burger (5) call the "accomodation principle". 
The authors use multiple regression in an attempt to determine what 
variables have an effect on the level of a bank's asset categories. 
Conside.ring the work of Anderson and Burger (5) and Dewald and Dreese 
(47) it is not surprising that none of their models gave an accurate 
explanation of the bank's asset categories. 
Single Period Profit Maximization Articles 
Orr and Mellon (120) used a two asset, i.e., reserves and loans, 
model to indicate the profit maximizing activities of the firm. The 
economic trade-off studied in this model was between the increased 
marginal revenue from increasing the amount of the bank's portfolio held 
1 In the late 1940s and through the 1950s banks believed in the real 
bills doctrine. This doctrine said that banks should make only short-
term selfliquidating loans. This concept of bank behavior focused on 
the liquidity of the bank with no consideration given to bank profit-
ability. 
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as loans and the potential for increased cost due to the bank being less 
liquid after the increase in loans. Orr and Mellon indicated that the 
costs were in the form of a lump sum payment when the bank first becomes 
illiquid plus a cost of x per dollar for each dollar of reserves which 
the bank was short. The primary constraint placed on the bank was that 
the bank must meet its reserve requirements with the reserves from the 
present and p~ior periods, i.e., no sale of securities or loans to 
increase reserves. The authors concluded that the uncertainty of cash 
inflows to the bank will decrease the expansion of bank credit. Cooper 
(39) in a later article showed that the conclusion by Orr and Mellon 
was incorrect. He indicated that increased uncertainty about the bank's 
deposit inflows does not have to lower the expansion multiplier. 
In a different type of study, Shull (142) perceived a bank as a 
multiple product price discriminating firm. The bank was said to be a 
profit maximizer, but no explicit mathematical model was presented to 
justify this assumption. The author views a bank as having a variety 
of markets and offering services in each market. The bank will expand 
from its most profitable markets into markets which are less and less 
profitable until there are no more markets in which the marginal revenue 
in the market exceeds the marginal cost in the market. 
Haydon and Wicks (77) present a normative model which indicates the 
portfolio of earning assets a bank will hold to maximize its profits. 
The economic trade off in this model is between the true rate of interest 
on a loan and all the costs associated with making, administrating, and 
collecting the loan. The authors consider four constraint equations 
dealing with the non.-narketability of the loans, the maturity structure 
of the loan portfolio, the amount which can be loaned to one borrower 
and the expected risk due to the uncollectability of a loan. The 
authors do not consider explicitly any cash or liquidity in the cost 
functions for the loans which they derive. Haydon and Wicks conclude 
that the model provides operating principles which a bank could use to 
make its portfolio decisions. 
In a descriptive model Bryan and Carleton (21) attempt to explain 
a bank's short-term portfolio adjustments to monetary policy. The 
authors use a partial adjustment model to describe the bank's behavior. 
The bank is postulated to be constantly trying to minimize its holding 
of excess reserves. The authors do not say why the bank is minimizing 
its holdings of excess reserves, but it is assumed that the bank is 
trying to minimize its holdings of non-earning· assets. This does imply 
that the bank's objective is profit maximization. The bank's decision 
variable is its non-earning reserves. The bank changes its non-earning 
reserves in response to the yield it foregoes on the asset which is the 
closest substitute. The bank's earning reserves are then changed in 
response to the bank's shift in its non-earning reserves. 
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DePamphilis (45) presents a model of the short-term commercial bank 
adjustment process. Assuming that the objective of the bank is to maxi-
mize its profits, the author sets up the short-term model with an objec-
tive of minimizing the cost of the short-term adjustment. The minimiza-
tion is subject to a balance sheet and a net liquidity constraint. The 
author tests the model using ordinary least squares regression and finds 
that is gives an adequate explanation of the short-term adjustment 
behavior of a commercial bank. 
Beazer (8) uses a single period linear programming model 
repetitively for 16 to 27 periods for 14 banks to determine if the model 
has any predictive ability. The model's objective function is to 
maximize the expected returns of the 20 asset categories times the 
amount in each asset category. The objective function is restricted 
by nine constraints. The constraints are for (1) capital adequacy, 
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(2) required reserves, (3) restricting the amount in real estate loans, 
(4) pledged assets, (5) balance sheet balancing equations with trans-
action balances and balances with other banks, (6) maintaining enough 
capital to cover risk assets, (7) liquidity, (8) balance sheet balancing 
equations with other assets and cash in the process of collection, and 
(9) making sure total assets in thf;! solution do not exceed the actual 
total assets of a particular bank. In testing the predictive ability 
of the model the author regressed the predicted asset values on actual 
asset values for the 14 banks. The regression revealed that over half 
of the regression coefficients were significantly different from zero. 
This indicates that the model was not a good predictor of the decisions 
made by bank managers. The author notes that the inability of the model 
to accurately predict could be due to lags in the adjustment process. 
Beazer's affirmation that lags in the allocation process could have 
reduced the predictive ability of his model is only one of several 
reasons for the model's poor predictive performance. The failure of 
this type of model to consider the liability side of the balance sheet, 
either in absolute or in difference form, is also a cause of the model's 
inability to predict accurately. Further, the model ignores the multi-
period aspect of the allocation process. It can also be said of this 
and other optimization models that they require information which is 
impossible to obtain, i.e., the true return on a particular asset, etc. 
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Hester and Pierce (84) provide a model of bank behavior similar to 
Walker (150), Beazer (8), and Haydon and Wicks (77). Their objective is 
to maximize the bank's profits subject to a balance sheet constraint. 
The authors discuss legal, managerial, and risk constraints but do not 
include them explicitly in the model. The bank responds to changes in 
deposits and interest rates by adjusting its portfolio of assets. The 
model is tested using ordinary least squares regression. The deposit 
and other variables are regressed on the asset categories to find three 
things. First, what variables have tqe greatest effect in determining 
the levels of the asset categories? Second, what time lag is there in 
the adjustment process, i.e., how long does it take funds from deposits 
to flow into the asset categories? Finally, which types of deposits 
are most closely correlated with which asset categories? Hester and 
Pierce, using a pool-of-funds approach, assume that the funds flowing 
into the bank go first into cash and near cash assets, second into 
securities, and finally into loans. The study's results confirm this 
lag structure. The studies results also indicate that the composition 
and history of the bank's deposits are important determinants of the 
asset portfolio structure. The authors find that the lag structures 
are stationary over time and that the responses to demand and time 
deposit inflows are different for different assets. They further 
conclude that the cost of asset adjustment is an important determinant 
of portfolio composition. Hester and Pierce (84) also confirm the 
results of Kane and Malkiel (96), Dewald and Dresse (47), Stuble and 
Wilderson (146), and Frazer and Rose (62), i.e., that the predictability 
of a bank's deposits is an important determinant of the composition of 
the bank's asset portfolio. 
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It is important to note that the assumption by the authors that 
funds flow first into cash and near cash assets is a pool-of-funds 
assumption. The authors continue to use a pool-of-funds approach when 
they regress both short- and long-term deposits on each asset category, 
implying that neither a particular deposit category nor a particular 
component of any deposit category is important in determining a particular 
asset category. Their use of all deposit maturities to explain each 
asset category is very consistent with the pool-of-funds approach. It 
is also interesting to perceive that the authors, while giving the bank 
an optimization objective, use a pool-of-funds allocation procedure to 
te.st their model. 
Multiperiod Profit Maximization Articles 
Thore (148) considers the bank's need to hold cash and short-term 
cash assets to buffer against adverse changes in deposits. He uses 
chance constrained two stage programming under uncertainty to determine 
the maximum level of the bank's profits. His objective function, like 
that of Orr and Mellon (120), consists of a component for the increased 
profits due to increased lending by the bank and a component for the 
possible increase in costs due to the decrease in the bank's liquidity 
position. The objective function is then constrained so that any change 
in the bank's excess reserves will have to equal any borrowing done by 
the bank plus any increase in excess reserves caused by an increase in 
deposits. Thore points out that two stage programming is superior to 
the "inventory theoretic approaches" used by Orr and Mellon (120), Cooper 
(39), and Porter (127). The technique is better because (1) it provides 
automatic access to a dual program and the information which it can 
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provide, and (2) the programming model can be extended to cover more 
constrained situations with less effort than can the inventory theoretic 
~~dels. 
Following the work of Charnes and There (28) and There (148), Fried 
(63) uses chance constrained programming to model bank behavior. The 
model assumes the bank is trying to maximize expected profit subject to 
liquidity, reserve requirements, pledged assets and budget constraints. 
The author's attempt to incorporate imperfect asset markets and liabil-
ities which are not under the control of the bank into the model is 
similar to the work of Charnes and There (28). Fried generates asset 
portfolios using his model and compares them to actual bank portfolios. 
He concludes that the findings are not consistent with his hypothesis, 
i.e., the banks do not behave according to his model. This work, like 
Beazer (8), indicates that optimization models are not good predictors 
of bank behavior. 
In a classic article Chambers and Charnes (26) develop a model for 
maximizing the profits from a bank's asset portfolio over time. They 
use a dynamic programming model which is tied together over time by 
coupling constraints. The model has two intraperiod constraints. The 
first is to make sure that a bank meets the reserve requirements set by 
the regulatory authorities. The second provides that the bank maintain 
a balanced portfolio so that it meets the leverage requirements set by 
the Federal Reserve Bank examiners. The model allows the bank to choose 
its profit maximizing asset portfolio given that it knows its demand 
and time deposits, the level of interest rates and the bank's net worth 
for future time periods. One advantage of this model formulation is 
that it will immediately provide a dual solution to the portfolio 
problem indicating the incremental value of adding one unit of that 
asset to the optimal portfolio. 
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The model presented by Walker (150) assumes that the bank adjusts 
its asset portfolio; cash, investments, loans, fixed assets, and other 
assets; as a reaction to changing interest rates, liquidity needs, and 
growth. Walker assumes that the objective of the bank is to maximize 
profits subject to a variety of constraints. The tool chosen to analyze 
the bank's behavior is a linear recursive programming model. Recursive 
programming differs from dynamic programming in that it does not optimize 
over the entire time horizon under study; rather it optimizes period by 
period. The author describes the interactions among the variables which 
are controlled by the bank in a series of single-equation least squares 
regressions. The regression equations are used to determine the actual 
parameters for a particular bank. These regression equations are then 
put into a reduced form and used as the constraints in the recursive 
programming format. 
Stone and Reback (145) provide a model for portfolio revisions. 
The model differs from others in that it introduces goal programming 
to the portfolio revision problem and considers transaction costs in 
determining the optimum revision for a portfolio. The authors introduce 
both a single and multiperiod model. In both models the objective is 
to maximize "the increase in risk adjusted expected returns less the 
transaction costs per dollar incurred in obtaining the improvement in 
expected return". Both models have four constraints. The first is a 
non-negativity constraint, i.e., purchases and sales of a particular 
asset must be greater than zero. The second restricts the amount that 
can be spent on new assets to the amount sold less transaction costs. 
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The third constraint prohibits short sales. The final constraint forces 
diversification among the assets such that all the funds will not flow 
into one asset. In conclusion, the authors point out that their models 
provide good approximations to the results obtained from quadratic pro-
granuning models used in other portfolio revision studies • 
. . Single Period Utility Maximization Articles 
Kane and Malkiel (96) discuss a model of bank behavior which will 
maximize the expected utility of the bank. The utility of the bank 
managers is expressed in terms of a mean-variance portfolio framework. 
The only constraint in the model is a balance sheet constraint. Their 
purpose was to show that the tenet of the availability doctrine, i.e., 
that lenders in response to credit policy are the most important factor 
in controlling the amount of credit in circulation, is not correct. 
The authors conclude that an increase in deposit variability increases 
the risk exposure of the bank. They also conclude that it is better 
for a bank to increase its risk exposure, by making more loans than a 
bank deems optimum, as well as its profitability. This is opposed to 
denying the loan request and increasing risk exposure, due to the loss 
of customer goodwill, and not increasing profits. 
Michaelsen and Goshay (115) postulate a utility maximizing behavior 
on the part of financial intermediaries. The authors differ from pre-
vious research in that they hypothesize "an institutional utility function 
common to all firms in a given financial industry". The result being 
that all firms have similar policies toward the risk characteristics of 
their equity. The authors also point out that it is the concept of 
"homemade" diversification which allows investors to be indifferent to 
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the asset structure of the intermediary. Therefore, investors risk 
preferences have no influence on the financial intermediaries portfolio 
decisions. Investor indifference is what causes the authors to postulate 
a common utility function in an attempt to explain how one firm determines 
its risk class. Sharpe's model is used as the model of institutional 
behavior. It allows the introduction of risk constraints placed on the 
maximizing behavior of the firm by the common utility function. The 
authors use regression analysis to test their model in the property and 
casualty insurance industry. They conclude that a common institutional 
utility function does exist in this industry. 
Similar to many of the previous studies, Russell (139) describes 
a model in which the bank is to maximize its expected utility. The 
bank is to have an inflow of deposits which is to be a random variable 
but is to be ignored in determining the bank's expected utility. The 
bank will adjust its portfolio based upon the expected future returns of 
its assets. The decision variables are the assets within the bank's 
portfolio. The author notes that seldom are the actual and optimal 
values for the assets equal. His contribution to the field is in 
postulating a Markov process to explain the adjustment process from the 
actual toward the optimal portfolio. The transition probabilities are 
represented by the difference between the yield on a particular asset 
and all other assets in the portfolio. The higher the yield on asset 
i relative to the yields on the other assets iri the portfolio, the 
greater the probabilities will transfer to that asset. Russell does an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to determine if the variables 
postulated in the model actually do contribute to the adjusting of the 
asset portfolio. He concludes that the amount of an asset in the 
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previous period, the yield on the asset, and the deposit inflow for 
this period definitely affect the level of a particular asset category. 
Aigner and Bryan (2) present a short run adjustment model of a 
bank's asset portfolio. Their model maximizes the total utility of the 
bank considering the short-run decision variables, i.e., excess reserves, 
Federal funds and investments. The model has only one constraint which 
is a modified balance sheet restriction, i.e., modified such that the 
decision variables on both the asset and liability sides are short term. 
The model implicitly considers risk and liquidity but does so in what the 
authors call the "subjective returns", i.e., utility. The authors test 
t.heir nwdel using an OLS regression. While the empirical results 
generally agree with their theory, the results. were such that they were 
dissatisfied with their empirical model. 
Klein (97) introduces a normative model of banking behavior which 
allows for competition and market structure. The model's main contri-
bution is that it considers the interest elasticity of asset supply to 
the bank, i.e., an increase in loans will cause the bank to have a reduc-
tion in the marginal returns on the loans. The model maximizes expected 
utility by maximizing the bank's rate of return on equity. The author 
ignores all constraints other than a balance sheet constraint. Two 
ignored constraints which the author states would definitely change the 
formulation of the model are reserve requirements and interest ceilings 
on deposits. Using a three asset portfolio consisting of loans, cash 
and government securities, Klein finds that the bank should continue to 
make loans until the marginal return on loans equals the average expected 
return on government securities. He also finds that cash is held until 
its marginal return is equal to the expected return on government 
securities. 
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Pyle (130) considers the portfolio problem in financial intermed-
iaries while abstracting from the liquidity and transactions demand 
problems of the intermediaries. His model has an objective function which 
is referred to as the intermediaries preference function and is expressed 
in terms of the mean and variance of the firm's terminal wealth. The 
maximization of the objective function is constrained only by a balance 
sheet equation. The portfolio in the model contains three assets which 
the author does not specify, but they are assumed to be cash, securities, 
and loans. The solution to the model indicates that intermediation is 
more likely to occur in the following situations: (1) the larger the 
risk premium on loans and the smaller the risk premium on deposits, 
(2) the greater the positive dependence betweer loans and deposit returns, 
and (3) the smaller the standard deviation of loan yields and the larger 
the standard deviation of deposit yields. 
In this article, Hyman (91) develops a normative model which indi-
cates the optimal allocation and size for a bank portfolio. The model 
is designed to maximize the expected utility of the bank by maximizing 
the expected yield on an asset per unit of risk. The only constraint in 
the model is the individual bank's degree of risk aversion. The author 
shows that the financial intermediaries' decision on the portfolio 
allocation and size are in fact separable, i.e., they can be treated as 
two separate effects. Using a quadratic utility function Hyman shows 
that the two effects are in fact similar to the income and substitution 
effects of traditional microeconomics. The author points out that any 
intermediary changing the composition of its portfolio because of 
changes in the risk-return parameters will be faced with the two effects. 
In summary, Hyman indicated that the mean-variance portfolio model 
cannot completely capture all of an intermediary's behavior patterns 
because of the restrictive assumptions in the model. 
Silverberg (144) uses a mean-variance model to show that banks 
respond to increasing deposit costs by increasing their holding of 
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more risky assets and thereby raising their return. This article like 
Anderson and Berger (5), Gillespie, Hodgeman, and Yancey (68) and Dewald 
and Dreese (47) shows that banks are very profit conscious. They are 
profit conscious to the point that they will adjust their asset port-
folios to maintain what bank management considers to be an acceptable 
level of profit. This research does not imply profit maximization by 
the bank, only a definite consideration of profits. 
Single Period Wealth Maximization Articles 
Melitz and Pardue (113) present a strictly economic analysis of 
the demand and supply of bank loans. Assuming that the bank's objective 
is to maximize its own present value, the authors derive demand and 
supply equations for the bank's loans. The bank is limited only by a 
budget constraint. The authors then test their theory using both single 
stage and simultaneous equation regression models. They find that all 
variables in both the supply and demand equations are significant in 
explaining the supply and demand for commercial bank loans. 
Pringle (128) uses the Sharpe-Litner-Mossin (SML) capital asset 
pricing model to develop a one period-two asset normative model of bank 
portfolio behavior. The model's main contribution to the portfolio 
adjustment process is its removal of the perfect market assumptions and 
the inclusion of imperfect market assumptions in the derivation. The 
model is an unconstrained wealth maximization model, i.e., it maximizes 
the present value of the end of period cash flows. The optimal loan 
balance for any bank is found to be at the point where the marginal 
revenue from the loan portfolio is just equal to the marginal cost of 
the risk to the bank of holding that loan portfolio. 
Multiperiod Wealth Maximization Articles 
Cohen and Hammer (35) criticize the asset allocation approach to 
bank asset management and present a model used by the Bankers Trust 
Company of New York. The model: 
• • • maximizes the present values of the net income stream 
plus realized capital gains (and losses) during the planning 
horizon·plus the present value of the stockholders' equity 
during the final period of the planning horizon (35, p. 150). 
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The model uses both intra-period constraints and inter-period constraints. 
The intra-period constraints are the same for each period and include 
risk or leverage constraints, a basic balance sheet constraint, safety 
and liquidity constraints and constraints which arise due to the 
"economic and institutional realities of the market place11 • The inter-
period constraints occur over the planning horizon of the model and are 
constraints on the flow of balance sheet accounts, constraints on the 
capital funds in the bank and constraints on the interrelationships 
between the services provided by the bank, i.e., making a loan at a 
lower rate to attract a customer's deposit. This model uses linear 
programming models to determine the user's portfolio adjustments. 
Other Optimization Articles 
Porter (127) derives a normative model of a bank's portfolio 
behavior. The author's model is a one period-three asset, i.e., cash, 
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securities and loans, formulation. Porter assumes the bank is attempting 
to maximize the "expected additions to net worth". He also assumes that 
the variance of the returns on the asset categories is not to be included 
in his model. Porter points out that the purpose of including the 
variance in a model is to help explain diversification. His model is 
not concerned with diversification but with the maximization of the 
additions to net worth. The author shows how banks can be in one of 
three stages relative to handling an outflow of funds. He then formulates 
a relationship between the change in net worth and the pertinent earning 
assets for each stage in which the bank might find itself. 
Silber (143) models a bank's portfolio behavior in an attempt to 
find which bank ass~ts are substitutes and which are compliments. The 
study is strictly positive in nature. The author derives supply and 
demand equations for a bank's assets and liabilities and uses a two 
stage-least squares regression model to find the relationships between 
bank assets and liabilities. His study differs from others presented in 
that the bank's decision variable for loans is the rate the bank will 
charge on the loans. The model assumes that the bank's deposits and 
quantity of loans are constraints on the bank's adjustment process. 
Studies Using the Pool-of-Funds Approach 
The literature is not replete with studies using this theory •. The 
two studies presented here do not specifically state a pool-of-funds 
theory, but their assumptions about how funds flow through a bank indi-
cate they feel a bank acts according to this theory. The reason for the 
lack of research could be because the pool-of-funds theory does not 
postulate a specific objective of bank management. The theory describes 
or hypothesizes about bank behavior without a statement of why this 
behavior is observed. As in the previous section, the articles are 
p~esented in chronological order. 
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Pierce (124) using time series data, does an empirical study about 
the allocation of deposit funds to the various asset categories of a 
bank. He uses a reduced form regression model for three major asset 
categories, i.e., reserve assets, investments and loans. He postulates 
that inflows of deposits will initially go into reserve assets and sub-
sequently into various investment and loan categories. The author also 
postulates that funds will move out of reserve assets and into investments 
very quickly while taking longer to move from reserve assets to loans. 
His model indicates that the level of assets ip time period t will depend 
upon: (1) the bank's level of demand deposits, (2) its level of time 
and saving deposits, (3) the expected return on the asset, (4) the 
variability of the expected return, (5) the bank's level of capital, 
(6) its income, and (7) a variable representing time. The author esti-
mates outcomes for the same model using varying time horizons for the 
independent variables and finds that the model does not allow strong 
conclusions to be drawn about the adjustment process. He concludes the 
poor results are due to the reduced form character of the equations and 
poor data. Serially correlated residuals prevented the author from 
making any tests of significance. 
Melnik (114) uses a first difference model to explain a bank's 
short term portfolio behavior. His interpretation of the OLS regression 
coefficients indicate which variables are important in determining the 
short term adjustments of a bank's asset portfolio. The author concludes 
that the initial adjustment of a bank's portfolio is in the more liquid 
22 
assets. He also concludes that changes in relative interest rates of the 
assets and the deposit variability are important determinants of a bank's 
~~set portfolio adjustments. 
Studies Using the Asset Allocation Approach 
No studies could be found which implied the use of the asset alloca-
tion theory. The lack of research in this area could be for two reasons. 
First, like the pool-of-funds theory, the asset allocation theory does 
not postulate any specific objective of bank management. It conjectures 
about bank behavior without attempting to explain why the behavior is 
observed. Second, Cohen and Hammer (35), in an early article on bank 
asset allocation, criticize the asset allocation theory for two reasons. 
They point out that the theory does not differentiate between "the 
volatility of a particular dollar of deposit and minimum amounts and 
stability of those deposit balances" (35, p. 156) •. Second, the authors 
say that the theory ignores the interrelationship between a bank's source 
of funds and its uses, particularly the feedback mechanism between a 
bank's uses and its sources. 
Conclusion 
The review shows that there are many ideas about a bank's asset 
portfolio adjustment process. Yet no research has been done to compare · 
the predictive abilities of the different types of models about bank 
portfolio behavior, i.e., no work has. been done to find that model which 
is most descriptive of actual bank behavior. The only general review 
about bank portfolio adjustments was by Pyle (131), and it was more 
concerned with the different formulations of the models than with their 
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predictive ability. This research will provide additional insight into 
the predictive abilities of the models as well as indicating which of 
the three approaches about bank portfolio management most closely 
followed by commercial banks. 
The review also indicates that the two most widely assumed objectives 
of portfolio adjustment behavior are single period profit maximization and 
single period utility maximization. In the majority of utility maximi-
zation studies, utility is defined in a risk-return sense, i.e., the 
bank maximizes its utility by optimizing a risk-return relationship. 
Therefore, the two optimization objectives used in this research will be 
the same as those most often used in the literature. 
The review does substantiate that little work has been done using 
the pool-of-funds and asset allocation approaches. Even though these 
approaches are largely ignored in the current literature, it does not 
mean that banks do not behave in a manner postulated by one or both of 
the two approaches. 2 This study will include models designed to test 
the flow of funds through a bank to determine if either approach 
correctly describes current bank behavior. 
2 . 
The pool-of-funds and asset allocation approaches were used before 
the optimization approach to exPlain bank behavior. They do not provide 
the bank with an overall objective, such as profit maximization, nor are 
they as economically rigorous as the optimization approach. 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND MODELS 
The information presented in this section provides the basis for 
examining the adjustment process of a bank's asset portfolio. The major 
hypotheses to be tested as well as the models for testing the hypotheses 
are presented. Each hypothesis postulates a different form of bank 
behavior and is represented by a different model. 
Hypotheses 
This study has seven major hypotheses. Each one assumes a different 
form of bank behavior. The first five hypotheses specify a way in which 
the bank adjusts its asset portfolio. They do not specify an objective 
which .the bank is trying to achieve by the adjustment. The last two 
hypotheses do specify an objective which bank management is trying to 
achieve by adjusting its asset portfolio. The hypotheses should be 
considered in light of the three theories of bank asset allocation, i.e., 
pool of funds, asset allocation and optimization, presented in the first 
section of this paper. 
All hypotheses presented have been explicitly or implicitly implied 
in the literature, as shown in the previous chapter. Hypotheses one 
through five are design~d to answer two questions. Th.e first is, does a 
lag structure exist within the portfolio allocation process of commercial 





adjustment, i.e., asset allocation or pool-of-funds, best described the 
flow of funds through a bank? The means to answer these two questions 
Will be presented in the models portion of this chapter. Hypotheses six 
and seven are designed to test the optimization approach to asset allo-
cation presented in the introduction. 
All of the first five hypotheses will provide a test of the lag 
structure of the adjustment process. Hypotheses one and two will test 
the asset allocation theory of bank behavior. Both hypotheses assume 
the bank is only considering the maturity structure of the deposits in 
allocating funds to the assets. Hypotheses four and five, in line with 
Cohen and Hammer (35) and Hester and Pierce (84), assume that regardless 
of the maturity structure or variability of a particular deposit category 
there will always be some portion of that category which is available to 
the bank for investment. These hypotheses assume that the bank does not 
adjust its asset portfolio according to the maturity structure of the 
deposits but rather according to the permanent or transitory nature of 
the deposits. With these hypotheses, portions of short-term deposits, 
i.e., the permanent component, would go into long-term assets and portions 
of long-term deposits, i.e., the transitory component, would go into 
short-term assets. Hypothesis three is designed to test the pool-of-funds 
approach to a bank's asset portfolio adjustment process. This hypothesis 
in conjunction with hypotheses one and five will indicate first, if banks 
use a pool-of-funds approach and, second, how banks allocate funds from 
the pool to the asset categories. 
Hypotheses six and seven assume that the bank is behaving according 
to the optimization theories of asset allocation. Hypothesis six repre-
sents the banks as attempting to maximize its profit subject to a set of 
26 
specified constraints. Hypothesis seven is a modification of the opti-
mization theory in that it allows for the explicit incorporation of risk 
into the assumed bank behavior. 
The major hypotheses of this paper are: 
Hypothesis No. 1 
H0 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a long-term 
maturity will ~ be placed into asset categories which have a long-term 
maturity. 
H1 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a long-term 
maturity will be placed into asset categories which have a long-term 
maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 2 
H0 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a short-term 
maturity will not be placed into asset categories which have a short-term 
maturity. 
H1 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a short-term 
maturity will be placed into asset categories which have a short-term 
maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 3 
H0 : All funds flowing into the bank as deposits will be placed into 
asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
H1 : All funds flowing into the bank as deposits will~ be placed 
into asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
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Hypothesis No. 4 
H0 : The transitory component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
transitory component of the long-term deposits will not be allocated to 
asset categories which have a short-term mnturity. 
H1 : The transitory component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
transitory component of the long-term deposits will be allocated to asset 
categories which have a short-term maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 5 
H0 : The permanent component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
permanent component of the long-term deposits will not be allocated to 
asset categories which have a long-term maturity. 
H1 : The perman~nt component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
permanent component of the long-term deposits will be allocated to asset 
categories which have a long-term maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 6 
H0 : A bank will adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
maximize bank profits. It will make the adjustments restricted by legal, 
regulatory and managerial constraints. 
H1 : A bank will not adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
maximize bank profits. It will make the adjustments restricted by legal, 
regulatory and managerial constraints. 
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Hypothesis No. 7 
H0 : A bank adjusts its asset portfolio in such a way as to minimize 
its risk for a given level of return or maximize its return for a given 
level of risk. 
H1 : A bank will not adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
minimize its risk for a given level of return or maximize its return for 
a given level of risk. 
Models 
The purpose of these models is to test the major hypotheses presented 
in the previous section. They are formulated to correspond with the three 
basic asset allocation theories, i.e., pool-of-funds, asset allocation 
and optimization; as well as modifications of these theories found in the 
literature. The models, when tested, should .indicate which of the three 
theories is the best predictor of bank behavior. 
There are two basic classes of models about a bank's asset portfolio 
adjustments to be compared in this research. They are heuristic and 
optimization models. The research will examine the predictive ability of. 
five heuristic stochastic models as well as the predictive ability of a 
linear and a non-linear optimization model. In all there are seven 
models whose predictive ability will be tested. Each model will test a 
different hypothesis, i.e., form of bank behavior, from the previous 
section. 
Heuristic Models 
There are five heuristic stochastic models. Each postulates a 
different behavior by a bank in handling the adjustments of its asset 
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portfolio. Heuristic models have been used frequently to describe bank 
portfolio adjustments 
The five heuristic models will all be of the basic form: 
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This model indicates that the amount of any asset category is a 
distributed lag function of the deposits or a summation of the deposits 
from previous periods. As stated in the hypotheses section of the 
chapter, each model will answer two questions. The first question is, 
is there a lagged relationship between deposits and assets, and if so, 
what is that relationship? The second question is, which of several 
postulated forms of bank asset adjustment behavior do banks actually 
follow? 
Long Term Group Allocation Model (LGAM). This model is designed to 
test hypothesis 1 in the previous section. It is a test of either the 
asset allocation or a modified pool-of-funds approach. Both are presented 
in the introductory section of this paper. In this model the bank is 
assumed to allocate long-term deposit groupings to asset categories with 
a long-term maturity. The formulation of the model is: 
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In this model the bank makes its adjustments on a deposit category 
by deposit category basis only. All of one long-term deposit category 
is assumed to flow into one or several asset categories with a similar 
maturity. There is no division of the deposit categories, i.e., into 
permanent or transitory components, prior to their allocation. 
A Short Term Group Allocation Model (SGAM). This model is designed 
to test hypothesis 2 in the previous section. It is a test of the asset 
allocation approach presented in the introductory section of this paper. 
This model postulates that a bank will allocate its short-term deposits 
to short-term assets. The formulation of the model is: 
-be s d 
A e i,t 
= l: L e w 
=b s s e 
( l: D t) + u. t 





A is the change in the i short term asset for the e repre-e i,t 
sentation in the tth time period, 
w is the weight assigned to 
s e 
eth representation in the 
th h in the V th e c ange 
th (t-s) time period, 
deposit for the 
32 
s 
L e is the lag operator, 




u·i is white noise, 
e , t 
e is a particular representation or design for each model, 
d is the total number of short term deposits which have an effect on 
eAi,t' 
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s e operator L • 
This model indicates that a bank will make its adjustments on a 
deposit category by deposit category basis only. No division of the 
deposit categories prior to allocation will be made. All of a particular 
short-term deposit category is assumed to go into one or several asset 
categories with a similar maturity. 
A Short Term Funds Model (SFM). The model in this section is 
designed to test hypothesis 3 in the previous section. It is a test of 
the pool-of-funds theory presented in the introductory portion of this 
paper. This model in conjunction with the LGAM and LCAM, will be used 
to test for a modified pool-of-funds behavior by the banks. A pure 
pool-of-funds approach would not be concerned with how funds are allocated 
from the pool. This model in conjunction with the LGAM and LCAM, however, 
does specify how funds are to flow from the pool. 
The test for a pool-of-funds behavior on the part of the banks is 
a two step process. The first step consists of comparing this model with 
the SGAM and SCAM models to see which best specifies the bank's adjustment 
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behavior. If this model best describes bank behavior, then the second 
step is to compare the LGAM and the LCAM to see which best describes the 
~ay in which funds are allocated from the pool. This process will be 
explained in more detail at the end of this section. 
The formulation of the model is: 
A. = 
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To understand why this model must be used in conjunction with the 
LGAM and LCAM models to test for a modified pool-of-funds behavior, 
consider the postulated flow of funds with the pool-of-funds approach. 
The pool-of-funds approach assumes that all funds flowing into the bank 
will go into a large pool. This model, the SFM, is designed to test if 
banks actually create such a pool. If such a pool is created, the pool-
of-funds approach indicates that funds are allocated from the pool on a 
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random basis. It is impossible to test for a pool-of-funds behavior when 
funds are allocated from the pool on a random manner. Therefore, 
a~sumptions must be made about how funds are to be allocated from the 
pool. To be consistent with the existing theories of asset portfolio 
adjustment, i.e., asset allocation and the theory implied by Cohen and 
Hammer (35) and Hester and Pierce (84) to rectify the deficiencies of 
the asset allocation approach, it is postulated that funds will flow 
from the pool in one of two ways. In the first way, it is assumed that 
the funds which came from long-term deposit categories will be taken 
from the pool and placed into assets with a long-term maturity. This 
assumption is in keeping with the asset allocation approach. In the 
second way, it is assumed that the pool, i.e., the bank's short-term 
assets, can be divided into permanent and transitory components. It is 
also assumed that the permanent component of the pool will eventually 
be placed into assets with a long-term maturity. This assumption allows 
for the "minimum amounts and stability" ( 35, p. 156) of a particular 
deposit category which the asset allocation approach does not consider. 
The two assumptions about how funds are taken from the pool have a 
definite effect on bank behavior and therefore on the model to be tested. 
Consider the two assumptions on the outflow of funds from the pool in 
the order in which they are presented in the previous paragraph; the 
category assumption first and then the component assumption. 
Dividing the inflow of funds into deposit categories shows that the 
summation of short-term and long-term deposits must equal total deposits. 
Therefore, placing the preceding statement in mathematical notation 
gives: 
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D. t = D + D J, v,t z,t (5) 
where: 
Dj,t is total deposits, 
D is short-term deposits, 
v, t 
D is long-term deposits, 
z,t 
and 
j = 1 ' 2, ... ' m, 
v = 1, 2, ... , a, and 
z = 1, 2, ... ' d. 
a, d, and m are the number of long-term, short-term, and total deposit 
categories on the bank's balance sheet, respectively. Substituting (5) 
into (4) and using the long term portion of that equation gives the for-
mulation for the total adjustment process using a modified pool-of-funds 
behavior. It is: 
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th is the change in the weighted z 
deposit or summation of deposit categories 
in time period (t-s) which went into the 
short-term asset pool, 
and 
e is a particular representation or design for each model, 
uk is white noise, e , t 
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d is the number of long-term deposit categories which have an effect 
on A e-K. t' 
' 
h = 0, 1, .•• , M; M < oo and is the lead or lag period of the 
e r 
e operator L • 
th 
Equation (6) states that the long-term k asset is a doubly lagged 
function of the long-term deposits. The first lag occurs when the 
deposits are converted into short-term assets, and the second lag occurs 
when portions of the short-term assets are converted into long-term 
assets. 
Rearranging equation (6) to be: 
-h e 
e~,t • I:h 
r = e e 
-b e 
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shows that there are two differences between the LGAM and the total 
adjustment for long-term deposits using this modified pool-of-funds 
(7) 
approach. The differences are the weights assigned to each lagged 
deposit and the length of the lag for each deposit. 3 The difference in 
the timing, i.e., the lag, is the primary consideration at this point. 
There is only one set of data for each bank, therefore only one 
long-term model on a category by category basis can be estimated from 
the time series data for each bank. When a long term model on a category 
3rhe rearrangement of equation (6) into equation (7) is possible 
because of the additive and multiplicative properties of the phase and 
gain, respectively, within the spectral model. 
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by category basis is estimated and considered by itself, it will not be 
possible to tell whether the estimated model is the LGAM or equation (7). 
This is why the SFM must be compared to the SGAM to see if the bank 
actually creates a pool-of-funds. If the bank does, then the LGAM model 
can be expressed by equation (7). If the bank does not create a pool-of-
funds then equation (2) is the best representation of the long-term 
adjustment process on a category by category basis. 
The second way in which funds are assumed to be removed from the 
pool is on a component by component basis. It is obvious that for any 
deposit class j, total deposits, are comprised of the permanent and the 




D is total deposits, 
j,t 
D is the permanent component of total deposits, 
p j,t 
Tnj,t is the transitory component of total deposits, 
j = 1, 2, ••. , m 
(8) 
m is the total number of deposit categories on the bank's balance 
sheet. 
Substituting equation (8) into equation (4) shows that A. is a 
. e 1,t 
summation of the lagge1 permanent and transitory deposit components. 
A. is also a summation of the permanent and transitory components of e 1,t 
the short term assets, i.e., A = A. + T A. • In this case e i,t Pe 1,t e 1,t 
A is defined as before and: 
e i,t 
A is the permanent component of the short term assets in Pe i,t 
period t, and 
A is the transitory component of the short term assets in Te i,t; 
period t. 
Substituting equation (8) into (4) and considering the previous 
statement yields: 
· A + A Te i,t Pe i,t 













E T D. + w L e 
e J, t s j=l e 
E p D. ) + u 
j=l e J,t e i,t 
















=b e e 
j=l 
s m 
w L e E p D. + u s 
j=l 
e J,t e i,t 
e 
Equation (10) and (11) are warranted because of the way in which the 
short-term asset portfolio is created in equation (4). Equation (4) 
(11) 
states that the only contributor to the bank's short-term asset portfolio 
is the bank's deposit inflows. 4 While not strictly true, it is assumed 
that the inflows which are omitted will not significantly affect the 
4rt should be pointed out that the formulation of the SFM model 
changes significantly if this assumption underlying equation (4) is 
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(4A) 
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short-term portfolio. Since deposits are the only contributor to the 
bank's short-term assets then the permanent deposit components must be 
permanent components of the short-term assets. There is no mechanism in 
the model which would cause the assets to deviate. 
Equation (11) is the most important since it provides the information 
needed to show the outflow of funds from the pool on a component by 
component basis. In equation (11) funds are taken from the pool created 
in equation (4) and transferred to asset categories with longer maturities. 
The formulation for the removal of funds from the pool on a component 
basis is: 
e~,t = 
Substituting (11) into 
-h 
e 
~· = l: w 
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Equation (13) indicates that the long-term assets are a time lagged 
(12) 
(13) 
function of the permanent components of the deposit categories. The 
and 
Ot is the lagged funds inflow to short term assets from sources other 
than deposits, i.e., loan repayments, changes in the bank's 
capital, etc., 
eAi,t' ws ' 
e 
s e 
L , D. t and u. are defined as in (4). J, e 1,t 
The formulation in 
longer hold. This 
equation (4A) means that equations (10) and (11) no 
in turn means that equation (13) must be changed to: 
-h e r n 
A = l: w L e e k,t 
r =h r e 
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i=l e 1,t e 1,t 
(13A) 
e e 
which is equation (12). The assumption is critical in determining the 
model which is to be tested. 
40 
first lag occurs when the deposits are placed into short-term, near cash 
assets, and the secQnd is when the funds are taken from the short-term 
pool and transferred into assets with a longer maturity. Equation (13) 
postulates a flow from deposits to assets different from equation (6). 
The difference being that this equation assumes that funds flow out of 
the pool on a component basis. 
Rearranging equation (13) yields: 
-h 
e 
~ • E 
e-K,t h 
r = e e 
r +s m 
L e e ( E D. ) + u 
j=l Pe J,t e k,t 
(14) 
Comparing equation (14) and the LCAM shows that there are two differences 
in the total adjustment for the permanent component of the deposits using 
this modified pool-of-funds approach. The differences are the weights 
assigned to each lagged deposit components and the length of the lag for 
each deposit component. As before, it is the lag that is the most 
important at this point. 
In this case, as with the other method of outflow from the pool, 
there is only one set of data for each bank. Therefore, only one long-
term adjustment model, on a component by component basis, can be esti-
mated. When this long-term adjustment model is estimated and considered 
by itself, it will not be possible to determine whether the estimated 
model is the LCAM or equation (14). This is why the SFM must also be 
compared to the SCAM to see if the bank actually created a pool-of-funds. 
If the bank does create a pool-of-funds, then the LCAM model can be 
expressed by equation (14). If the bank does not create a pool-of-funds, 
then equation (16) is the best representation of the long-term adjustment 
process on a component by component basis. 
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Up to this point, the SFM has been compared to both the SGAM and the 
SCAM. If a bank does create a pool-of-funds it should be evidenced by 
th~ fact that the SFM has w's which are significantly different fro~ 0 
while the SGAM and SCAM does not. The only question remaining is, if 
the bank does create a pool-of-funds then does equation (7) or equation 
(14) best describe the long-run adjustment behavior from the pool, i.e., 
does the bank allocate funds from the pool on a category or component 
basis. An examination of the w's of the two models should indicate 
which behavior pattern the bank follows. The equation, i.e., model, 
which has w's significantly different from 0 will be the model which 
best describes the bank's behavior. If the bank does create a pool-of-
funds and neither equation (7) or (14) have w's;significantly different 
from 0, then this would give evidence of a pure pool-of-funds behavior. 
A Short Term Component Allocation Model (SCAM}. The short term 
component allocation model is designed to test hypothesis 4 in the 
previous section. This model is a test of bank behavior first implied 
by Cohen and Hammer (35) and later explicitly stated, but not actually 
tested, by Hester and Pierce (84). The model will assume that a bank 
can determine the permanent and transitory components of any deposit 
iriflow. It will also assume that the bank adjusts its asset portfolio 
in response to the permanent or transitory nature of the deposit inflows. 
It is postulated that the bank will allocate the permanent components of 
its deposits, regardless of the short-term or long-term nature of the 
deposit category, to the long-term assets and the transitory components 
to the short-term assets. This model will test the transitory component 
to short-term asset assumption. 
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A is the change in the ith short term asset for the eth repre-
e i,t 
sentation in the (t-r)th time period, 
wr is the weight assigned to the transitory part of the change in 
e 
the jth deposit for the eth representation in the (t-r)th time 
period, 
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L e is the lag operator, 
Tenj,t is the transitory component of the change in the jth deposit 
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in the (t-r) time period, 
e is a particular representation or design for each model, 
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b = 0, 1, ..• , M; M < oo and is the lead or lag period of the 
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This model, along with the LCAM, is designed to eliminate the short-
comings of the asset allocation theory as presented by Cohen and Hammer 
(34) and Cohen and Hammer (35). 
A Long Term Component Allocation Model (LCAM). This model is 
designed to test hypothesis 5 from the previous section. Like the SCAM, 
this model will assume that a bank can determine the permanent and 
transitory components of any deposit inflow. It will also assume that 
the bank adjusts its asset portfolio in response to the permanent or 
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transitory nature of the deposit inflows. This model will test the 
permanent component to long-term asset assumption. 
The formulation of the model is: 
-he s m 
A_ = E w L e E P D. + uk 






A_ is the change in the k long term asset for the e presen-e-K,t 
tation in the (t-s)th time period, 
w is the weight assigned to the permanent component for the change 
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This model, like the SCAM, is designed to eliminate the short-
comings of the asset allocation theory as presented by Cohen and Hammer 
(34) and Cohen and Hammer (35). 
Optimization Models 
This research will use two optimization models to test hypotheses 
4 and 5. The two models assume a specific objective on the part of bank 
management, i.e., bank management adjusts its asset portfolio in an 
attempt to reach a desired objective. 
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A Linear Optimization Model (LOM). The model assumes that the 
objective of bank management is to maximize the bank's profits. The 
bank is adjusting its asset portfolio in an attempt to maximize profits 
is subject to various liquidity, legal and institutional constraints. 
The model includes the most accepted, i.e., most common and familiar, 
constraints found in the financial literature. This model, however, 
does not explicitly include one of the most important financial variables, 
i.e., risk. 
The formulation of the model is: 
5 
subject to: 
.005A1 + .04A2 + .04A3 + .06A4 + .lOA5 + .6511 + .0412 + 
.09513 ~ ~K 
c + .995A1 + .96A2 + 11 ~ D1 
c + .99SA1 + .96A2 + .90A3 + 12 > D1 
c + .995Al + .96A2 + .90A3 + .85A4 + 13 ~ D1 
x3 ~ rlDd + r2Ds 
x6 + x8 + xlO + xl2 ~ ~A (DF + Dst) 
x5 + x7 + x9 + xll + xl3 + xl4 + xl5 + xl6 ~ RrK 
x2 ~ Required Currency Holdings 











5 This model follows closely the notation and model in Beazer (8). 
and 
x17 • The Amount Required 
x1 = The Amount Required 
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E xi = 1 
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x represents the g asset categories of the bank defined in Table I. 
Each asset category is expressed as a percent of total assets. 
e, A1 , A2, A3 , and A4 are the liquidity classes of the bank's 
assets defined in Table I. 
11 , 12 , and 13 are capital adequacy variables which will cause the 
liquidity provided from the assets to be greater than or equal to 
the liquidity needed from the liabilities. 6 
D1 is the liquidity needed as a function of the bank's liabilities, 7 
K is the bank's actual capital, 
\ is the ratio of the bank's required to actual capital v~'-., 
r 1 is the demand deposit reserve requirement, 
r 2 is the savings deposit reserve requirement, 
D d is the bank's demand deposits, 
D is the bank's savings deposits, s 
~A is the bank's safety factor for covering its pledged assets and 
is greater than one, 
DF are the United States government deposits, 
6For a detailed definition of 1, see Beazer (8), pages 56 through 61. 
7n1 = .47 (demand deposits) + .36 (time deposits) + (deposits of 
banks and government)+ (borrowings). 
TABLE I 





Source: Beazer (8). 
Asset 
Cash in process of collection 
Currency and coin 
Reserves with Federal Reserve 
Balances with banks 
Loans to banks (fed. funds) 
Bills, certificates, govts. 
under one year 
Loans to brokers 
Governments, 1-5 years 
Loans to finance companies 
Governments 5-10 years 
Loans for purchase of 
securities 
Governments over 10 years 
Real estate loans 
Municipals and other 
securities 
Agricultural, commercial, 
and individual loans 
Consumer loans 
Other assets 
Capital adequacy vectors 
Capital adequacy vectors 











c8 > 0 
c 9 > 0 
clO > 0 




Dst are state government deposits, and 
R is the risk asset to capital ratio. r . 
Squation (17) is the bank's profit function which is to be maximized. 
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Equations (18) through (21) are capital adequacy constraints placed on a 
bank by the comptroller of the currency. The coefficients in equations 
(18) and (21) are those actually used by federal bank examiners. Equa-
tion (22) represents the bank's required reserves. Equation (23) makes 
sure the bank has enough of the proper securities pledged to cover its 
government deposits. A bank must hold capital equal to a certain per-
centage of its risk assets. Equation (24) constrains the bank to meet 
this requirement. Equation (25) causes the bank to hold enough currency 
and coin to cover its day to day transactions. Equation (26) forces the 
bank to cover the balances it must keep with other banks. It is assumed 
that the balances actually held are those actually required. It does 
not make sense to hold funds in nonearning assets if the bank does not 
have to. Equations (27) and (28) are balancing items. Equation (29) 
is the balance sheet constraint. 
A Mean-Variance Optimization Model (MVOM). This model, like the 
LOM, is designed to test the management science theory of bank behavior. 
More specifically, it is designed to test hypothesis 5. The model 
assumes that the objective of bank management is to minimize the bank's 
risk for a given level of return or maximize return for a given risk 
class. The difference in this model and the LOM is the explicit incor-
poration of risk into the model. 
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ajk represents the variance-covariance matrix of the bank's asset 
portfolio and is given such that ajk = akj' 
wj is the weight assigned to the jth asset of the portfolio. It is 
th equal to the dollar value of the j asset divided by the dollar 
value of the total asset portfolio. 
E(rj) is the actual expected return on the jth asset, and 
E1 is the desired expected return. 
Equation (31) is the objective function to be minimized. It provides 
an explicit measure of the bank's risk considerations and indicates that 
the bank establishes an acceptable rate of return and then minimizes the 
risk for that rate of return. Equation (32) is a balance sheet constraint. 
Equation (33) insures that only portfolios with the same expected return 
are considered. 
The model postulates that the bank makes its portfolio decisions in 
a mean variance world. It also presumes that cash is the riskless rate 
with a return of zero. Cash along with the other assets will define the 
efficient frontier for the bank, i.e., those asset portfolios with the 
lowest risk for a given level of return. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section of the study identifies the procedures to be used in 
testing the models stated in the previous section. It is followed by 
two separate sections which will state the tests to be used for comparing 
the predicted results with the actual results and the data sources, 
respectively. 
The seven models to be tested are again divided into heuristic and 
optimization groupings. The heuristic models, i.e., LGAM, SGAM, SFM, 
SCAM and LCAM are to be determined using spectral analysis and Hannan's 
inefficient method. The optimization models, i.e., LOM and MVOM, will 
use linear and quadratic programming, respectively. 
Techniques to Test the Heuristic Models 
The test of the heuristic models is a three step process. First, 
spectral analysis will be used for two purposes. It will be used to 
determine the length of the lead and lag structure for the heuristic 
models. Then it will be used to filter the change in the deposit inflows 
to obtain the permanent and transitory components for the deposit categories. 
Second, Hannan's inefficient method will be used to generate specific 
coefficients for each model and to test the statistical significance of 
those coefficients. Third, the model's coefficients will be used to 
generate predicted values for the changes in the asset categories in 
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subsequent periods. The predicted asset portfolio will then be compared 
to the actual asset portfolio held by the bank. 
The period for empirical testing is from June 13, 1973 to October 27, 
1976. A 151 week period from June 13, 1973 to April 28, 1976 was used 
to generate the coefficients for the heuristic models. These coefficients 
were then used to generate the predicted asset portfolios for 27 weeks, 
at three week intervals. This period is from May 12, 1976 through 
October 27, 1976. Over the 27 week period, nine predicted portfolios 
were generated. 
Spectral analysis provides three basic statistics in comparing one 
time series against another. The first is known as the gain. The gain 
gives, at each frequency, the amount that one series must be multiplied 
by to approximate the other time series. The gain is similar to a regres-
sion coefficient at each frequency where one time series is the dependent 
variable and one the independent variable. The second is known as the 
phase. The phase tells the fraction of a cycle that one series lags 
.behind another. The third is known as the coherence squared. The 
coherence squared between two time series is like a correlation coefficient 
and will always be between 0 and 1. 
The two statistics which this study will be most interested are the 
gain and the phase. These two statistics can be plotted for almost any 
theoretical relationship between two time series, i.e., a one period lag 
model between two time series will have a gain and phase diagram which 
is unique to that model. These plots are known as BODE plots or the 
gain and phase diagrams. Since BODE plots can be established for almost 
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any hypothesized relationship between two time series, it is possible 
to use these plots to define unknown relationships between two time 
8eries. Two time series, e.g., demand deposit inflows and treasury 
securities, could be compared such that a gain and phase diagram for the 
two series was obtained. The BODE plots for the unknown relationship 
could then be compared to the BODE plots for the known relationships 
until the unknown BODE plots matched a pair of known plots (53). The 
matching of the unknown with the known BODE plots would define the 
unknown relationship between the two time series. Once spectral analysis 
determines an approximate lag between the two series, Hannan's ineffi-
cient method will be used to estimate the exact coefficients of the model. 
The LGAM and SGAM will be determined in exactly this manner. 
The SCAM and LCAM will be tested in the same way, i.e. , using known 
BODE plots to define an unknown relationship. The difference in testing 
these models relative to the previous two is with regard to the time 
series being tested. The SGAM and LGAM models postulate that all of a 
deposit category's funds are allocated to the appropriate, i.e., short-
term or long-term, asset categories. The LCAM and SCAM postulate that 
the deposit funds are first divided into permanent and transitory compo-
nents and then allocated to the appropriate, i.e., long-term or short-
term, respectively, asset categories. Therefore, to test the LCAM and 
SCAM their permanent and transitory components must be determined. 
1This is due to the multiplicative and additive properties of the 
gains and phases of two time series, respectively, which have been 
multiplied together. 
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Spectral analysis again provides the tool for separating a time 
series into its permanent and transitory components. Spectral analysis, 
through the fourier transform, transforms a time series into the various 
frequency components which make up the series. By their definitions, 
permanent and transitory components represent funds which are with the 
bank all the time and funds which are transient in nature, respectively. 
Funds represented by high frequencies of the frequency spectrum would be 
those funds which are transient in nature. Funds represented by low 
frequencies of the frequency spectrum would be those funds which are 
permanent with the bank. The term used in spectral analysis for sepa-
rating the time series by frequency is demodulation. Spectral analysis 
will demodulate the deposit categories into their permanent and transitory 
categories. With the LCAM and SCAM, spectral analysis will be used as 
a two-step process to define the models. First, spectral analysis will 
divide the deposit categories into their permanent and transitory 
components. Second, the permanent and transitory components will be 
used as a basis to define the length of the lag for each model. 
Once all five models, i.e., LGAM, SGAM, SFM, SCAM and LCAM, have 
been defined, Hannan's inefficient method will be used to define the 
specific coefficients for each lagged variable. The coefficients should 
provide two things. First, the significant coefficients will be used to 
generate the predicted asset portfolios. Second, the significant coeffi-
cients will indicate the lead-lag structure for particular liability and 
asset categories. This latter function will also show if there is any 
significant relationship between a particular asset and liability cate-
gory. 
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Techniques to Test the Optimization Models 
The tools chosen to test the LOM and MVOM are linear programming 
and quadratic programming, respectively. As with the heuristic models, 
linear and quadratic programming will be used to generate predicted 
values for the bank's asset portfolio. These predicted values will then 
be compared to the actual portfolios held by the banks to determine if 
either is the best model of bank behavior. 
Procedures to Test the Predictive 
Ability of the Models 
One test will be used to determine which of the models has the best 
predictive ability. This test of the models' predictive ability will be 
the root mean square error (RMSE). This test will be used for all 
seven models. It will provide the final answer to the question, which 
model is the best predictor of current bank behavior. The RMSE for the 
th t asset category is: 
[ 
~ ( y - y . ) 2] 1/2 




Yt. is the predicted value 
th of the t asset, 
p J 
Yt. is the actual value of the 'Lth asset, a J 
N is the number of observations, 
M is the number of asset categories of the bank, 
and 
t = 1, 2, ... ' M 
j = 1, 2, ... ' N. 
No standardized tests exist to evaluate this statistic, therefore, 
comparison with other models is the only way to determine the worth of 
the predicted values. 
Data 
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The data for both the heuristic and optimization models for all four 
banks comes from six sources. The six sources are: 
1. A weekly report of deposits and related data submitted by each 
bank to the eleventh Federal Reserve District. 
2. A weekly report of condition for the four largest banks in the 
Dallas area, distributed by the eleventh Federal Reserve 
District. 
3. The annual report of condition for the, four banks, submitted by 
the banks to the Federal Reserve Board. 
4. The annual report of income for the four ban~s, submitted by 
the banks to the Federal Reserve Board. 
5. The Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
6. The Monthly Consumer Loan Interest Rate Survey, put out by the 
Division of Administrative Services of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
The data from the first four sources is used to estimate the beta 
coefficients in the heuristic models. The data from sources five and six 
is used in the optimization models as surrogates for some of the yields 
on investments made by the bank. 
The weekly data on the four asset categories studied, i.e., coin 
and currency, treasury securities, other securities and total loans, as 
well as the three liability categories studied, i.e., net demand 
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deposits, savings deposits and other time deposits, comes from sources 
one and two. Sources three and four were used to confirm or check the 
dlta provided by sources one and two. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS 
The results in this chapter are presented in two sections. The 
first section presents the interpretations of the coefficients and 
coefficient patterns for the heuristic models. The results in this 
section are presented by models and related back to the five hypotheses 
for the heuristic models. The second section presents the root mean 
square errors for the heuristic and optimization models. The root mean 
square errors for the heuristic models are pres~nted first, followed 
by the root mean square errors for the linear programming and quadratic 
programming models, respectively. The listings for the asset and . 
liability category designations are shown in Figure 1. 
Interpretation of the Coefficients and Coefficient 
Patterns of the Heuristic Models 
The results of the five heuristic stochastic models are presented 
in the following order: LGAM, SCAM, SFM, SCAM and LCAM. The results 
of each model for all four banks will be presented at the same time 
such that a comparison may be made, by model, between banks. 
Results of the LGAM Model 
Two asset and two liability categories were chosen as being long 
term asset and liability categories. The two asset categories are total 
loans and other securities held by the bank, i.e., these are securities 
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CC = coin and currency 
TS = treasury securities 
OS = securities other than treasury securities 
TL = total loans 
NDD = net demand deposits 
SAVD = savings deposits 
OTD = time deposits other than savings deposits 
TNS = NDD + SAVD 
TNT = NDD + OTD 
TST = SAVD + OTD 
TNST = NDD + SAVD + OTD 
Any designation which is followed with an S; 
i.e., CCS, NDDS, TNTS, etc., represents the short-
term component of the filtered asset and liability 
categories. 
Any designation which is followed with an L, 
i.e., TSL, SAVDL, TSTL, etc., represents the long-
term component of the filtered asset and liability 
categories. 




other than treasury securities. The two liability categories are other 
time deposits, i.e., time deposits other than savings deposits, and 
total time deposits, i.e., a combination of both savings and other time 
deposits. The two asset and liability categories provide four combina-
tions of the asset and liability categories which are tests of the LGAM 
model for each bank. The four combinations for each bank and their 
coefficients are presented in Tables II through V. Table II presents 
the combinations of the asset and liability categories which represent 
the LGAM model for bank 1. Table III is for bank 2. Table IV is for 
bank 3. Finally, Table V is for bank 4. 
Other Time Deposits on Total Loans. As Tables II-V indicate, the 
coefficients of the OTD on TL representation of1 the LGAM model are bank 
dependent, i.e., the pattern of significant coefficients for each bank 
does not exhibit a uniformity throughout the four banks. · For banks 1, 
2, and 4, however, all of the significant coefficients in this representa-
tion of the model are positive. This indicates that an increase in any 
OTD category in a period with a significant coefficient will cause an 
increase in the TL category. The only other relationship common to 
banks 1, 2, and 4, is that the total loans of each bank are affected by 
both lagged and leading amounts of other time deposits. The significance 
of the lagged_coefficients w~s expected. Since a first difference was 
-~--
taken in the data prior to applying Hannan's inefficient method, the 
change in the OTD category provides a source of funds for which a use is 
found some periods later in the change in total loans. The significance 
of the lead coefficients was not anticipated. Their significance is most 
probably caused by an active liability management on the part of banks 
1, 2, and 4. Each of the banks in time period t anticipates its future 
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TABLE II 
COEFFICIENTS .FOR THE LGAM FOR BANK 1 
Liability on Asset Category 
OTDBl OTDBl TSTBl TSTBl 
Time on on on on 
Period· TLBl OSBl TLBl OSBl 
11 .118* -.09 * .012 -.065* 
10 .049 -.052* .07 * -.065* 
9 .025 0 .019 -.025* 
8 .142* .007* .11 * .05 * 
7 .08 * ~-23 * .072* -.28 * 
6 .149* -.105* .114* .01 * 
5 .137* -.02 * .144* -.01 * 
4 -.05 -.045* -.025 -.03 * 
3 .137* -.17 * .1 * -.18 * 
2 .19" * -.28 * .11 * -.25 * 
1 .. 075* -.23 * .105* -.22 * 
0 .001 -.08 * 0 -.125* 
-1 .18 * -.29 * .115* -.225* .. 
-2 .os * -.065* -.008 -.11 * 
-3 .075* -.09 * .065* -.07 * 
.-4 .24 * -.22 * .18 * -.15 * 
-5 • 02 -.09 * .04 -.11 * 
-6 .147* -.26 * .117* -.205* 
-7 .07 * -.11 * .038 -.065* 
-8 .02 .04 * .059* .01 * 
-9 .051* -.007* .051* .05 * 
-10 .051* .01 * .as .01 * 
-11 -.001 -.19 * .025 - .155* 
-12 .02 -.15 * .01 -.125* 
*Indicates cci.lefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE. III 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LGAM FOR BANK 2 
~iability on Asset Category 
OTDB2 OTDB2 TSTB2 TSTB2 
Time on on on on 
Period. TCB2 OSB2 . TLB2 OSB2 
11 .06 * 0 .035* -.01 * 
10 .07 * -.05 * .05 * -.06 * 
9 .035* .038* .02 * .028* 
8 .197* .088* .175* .079* 
7 .21 * -.001 .19 * -.007 
6 .22 * -.001 .19 * -.007 
5 .225* .055* .225* .048* 
4 .17 * .062* .16 * .06 * 
3 .16 * .02 * .14 * .02 * 
2 .1 * -.01 .07 * -.012* 
1 .06 * .075* .05 * .03 * 
0 .175* .03 '# .15 * -.044* 
-1 .17 * -.055* .15 * - •. Q53* 
-2 .05 * .07 *. .03 * .07 * 
-3 .08 * .059* .06 * .058* 
-4 .14 * .09 * .13 * .087* 
-5 .36 * .042* • 34 * .04 * 
-6 .098* .01 .075* .01 
-7 .16 * .1 * .145* .097* 
-8 .02 .093* -.01 .088* 
-9 -.02 .042* -.04 * .038* 
-10 .05 * .015* .048* .01 
-11 .16 * .028* .15 * .019* 
-12 -.03 * .047* -.057* .039* 
*Indicates· coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE IV 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LGAM FOR BANK 3 
Liability on Asset Category 
OTDB3 OTDB3 TSTB3 TSTB3 
Time on on on on 
Period TLB3 OSB3 TLB3 OSB3 
11 0 -.001 -.002 -.001 
10 .007 .022* .008 .022 * 
9 -.0025 .005 -.0025 .005 
8 .008 .03 * .009 .03 * 
7 0 -.018* -.0001 -.015 * 
6 .015 .01 * .016 .005 
.. 
5 .032 -.001 .033 -.002 
4 .04 -.001 .009 -.002 
3 .017 .01 * .017 .01 * 
2 .008 -.001 .007 -.002 
1 .005 .01 * .006 .012 * 
0 .024 .118* .024 .12 * ..;.1 .011 -.009* .013 -.002 
-2 .0075 .008* .0075 .002 
-3 .01 .014* .01 .0012* 
-4 -.0001 -.008* .002 -.002 
-5 .0148 .07 * .012 .07 * 
-6 .017 .092* .018 .99 * 
-7 .016 -.075* .018 -.07 * 
-8 .0355 .008* .037 .01 * 
-9 .029 -.022* .. 033 -.021 * 
-10 .012 -.008* .014 -.01 * 
-11 .022 0 .023 0 
-12 .005 0 .008 0 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE V 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LGAM FOR BANK 4 
Liability on Asset Category 
OTDB4 OTDB4 TSTB4 TSTB4 
Time on on on on 
Period TLB4 OSB4 TLB4 OSB4 
11 .115* .0375* .09 * .028 * 
10 .05 .031 .028 .021 
9 .067* .028 .041 .019 
8 .139* .015 .11 * .005 
7 .13 * .014 .1 * .0045 
6 .115* .038 * .09 * .029 * 
5 .163* .039 * .139* .029 * 
4 .179* .048 * .152* .039 * 
3 .048 .046 * .02 .0375* 
2 .06 .039 * .032 .029 * 
1 .067* .0475* .04 .0375* 
0 .095* .024 .07 * .015 
-1 .115* .0575* .088* .046 * 
-2 .121* .048 * .1 * .039 * 
-3 .07 * .035 * .048 .026 * 
-4 .088* .031 .059* .021 
-5 .119* .035 * .098* .026 * 
:..6 .09 * .031 .062* .024 
-7 .058 .034 * .035 .025 * 
;.,8 .139* .062 * .118* .055 * 
-9 .063* .038 * .038 .03 * 
-10 .12 * .041 * .098* .031 * 
-11 .09 * .033 * .07 * .024 
-12 .12 * .028 .098* .019 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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cash flows for t+N periods. The cashflows it anticipates in the future 
periods obviously affect the amount of funds which each bank attempts 
to raise and use in period t. 
Bank 3 does stand alone in that all of the coefficients for the OTD 
on the TL representation of the LGAM model are insignificant. This 
indicates that the funds provided by the OTD category do not significantly 
affect the funds used in the TL category for bank 3. 
Other Time Deposits on Other Securities. This representation of 
the LGAM model is also bank dependent. In this case all four banks show 
significant lead and lag coefficients. 
The significant lag coefficients were anticipated. The significant 
lead coefficients were not anticipated. The explanation of the signifi-
cant lag coefficients is the same as before, i.e., a source of funds 
which has found a use. The explanation of the significant lead coeffi-
cients is once again an active liability management policy where each 
bank considers anticipated cash inflows when determining the funds to 
be used in a particular period. 
Banks 2, 3, and 4 all show a majority of positive coefficients 
which indicate that OTD and OS move in the same direction for these banks. 
Bank 1 differs from banks 2, 3, and 4 in that 19 of 21 significant 
coefficients are negative. This indicates that other time deposits 
and other securities move in opposite directions. A possible explanation 
is that bank 1 was making a concerted effort to increase total loans 
over the time period studied. This bank may have chosen to increase its 
funds available for loans by increasing some liabilities, i.e., other 
time deposits, and decreasing some assets, i.e., other securities. 
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Total Savings and Other Time Deposits on Total Loans. This design 
of the LGAM model finds results very similar to the previous two. Banks 
1, 2, and 4 have both significant lead and lag relationships. The 
coefficients for bank 3 are all insignificant. As with previous repre-
sentations of this model, significant lag relationships were expected; 
significant lead relationships were not. The explanations for the 
significant lead and lag coefficients are the same as those used for 
OTD and TL. Of the 51 significant coefficients for banks 1, 2, and 4, 
only two of the coefficients for bank 2 are negative. Forty-nine of the 
51 coefficients are positive. For banks 1, 2, and 4, total savings and 
other time deposits move in the same direction as total loans. This 
result and the insignificant coefficients for bank 3 were expected. The 
OTD component of the TST series dominates the savings deposits in the 
TST series. Therefore, it is not surprising to find results from this 
design of the model which are similar to those found in the OTD on TL 
representation of the model. 
Total Savings and Other Time Deposits on Other Securities. This 
depiction of the LGAM model yields significant lead and lag coefficients 
for all four banks. The explanations for these coefficients are the 
same as those for previous designs of the model. For banks 2, 3, and 4, 
the vast majority of their significant coefficients are positive. This 
indicates that as total savings and other time deposits increase for 
these three banks then so does their other securities. As with the OTD 
on OS representation, bank 1 for this design of the model has a majority 
of significant coefficients which are negative, i.e. , 18 of the 20 
coefficients. The ex?lanation for these negative coefficients could be 
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the same as that given the OTD on OS representation of the model. This 
explanation is further reinforced by the fact that the OTD component of 
TS~ dominates the savings deposit component of the series. Because of 
this domination, it is not surprising that the results from this design 
of the model are similar to those of the OTD on OS design. 
Results of the SGAM Model 
For this model two asset and three liability categories were chosen 
as being short-term asset and liability categories. The asset categories 
are coin and currency and treasury securities. The liability categories 
are net demand deposits, savings deposits and a summation of net demand 
deposits and savings deposits called total net demand and savings deposits. 
The two asset and three liability categories provide for six different 
designs of the SGAM model. The six designs and their coefficients are 
presented in Table VI through IX. Tables VI through IX each present all 
six designs of the SGAM model for banks 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Net Demand Deposits on Coin and Currency. This description of the 
SGAM indicates significant lead and lag coefficients for all four banks. 
The significant lag coefficients were anticipated and indicate that f.unds 
used in period t have come from sources in periods t-N. The significant 
lead coefficients were not predicted. They indicate that bank assets 
held in period t depend upon anticipated deposit inflows in periods t+N. 
As can be seen for the NDD on CC representation of the SGAM model 
almost all of the coefficients for the 12 lead and lag periods are 
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TABLE VI 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SGAM FOR BANK 1 
Liability on Asset Category 
NDDBl SAVDBl TNSBl NDDBl SAVDBl TNSBl 
Time on CCBl on on CCBl on, on on 
Period X 10-2 CCBl X 10-2 TSBl TSB1 TSB1 
11 -.35 * -.0071 -.18 * .068* .05 * .045* 10 -.2 * -.02 * -.09 * .065* .15 * .049* 
9 -.15 -.014 -.04 * .03 * .18 * .019* 
8 -.4 * -.0163* -.27 * -.05 * .5 * -.05 * 
7 -.38 * .0124 -.18 * -.06 * -.17 * -.078* 
6 -.355* .01 -.18 * .015* -. 82 * -.02 * 
5 -.35 * -.005 -.21 * .055* -.12 * .033* 
4 -.21 * -.006 -.09 * .059* .09 * .04 * 
3 -.475* 0 -.3 * .059* .19 * .04 * 
2 -.65 * -.006 -.49 * .083* .2 * .063* 
1 -.56 * -.009 -.38 * .063* .19 * .044* 
0 -.44 * -.02 * -. 31 * .042* .19 * .028* 
-1 -.70 * -.015 -.56 * .087* .1 * .074* 
-2 -.45 * 0 -.29 * .058* .19 * .042* 
-3 -.1 -.005 .07 * .03 * .19 * .015* 
;..4 -.2 * -.0034 -.04 * .05 * .08 * .024* 
-5 -.23 * 0 -.1 * .07 * .1 * .053* 
-6 -.3 * -.0075 -.17 * .055* -.025* .039* 
-7 -.31 * -. 0085 -.17 * .039* -.04 * .019* 
-8 -.3 * .0123 -.09 * .02 * .03 * .002* 
-9 -.38 * -.006 -.23 * .019* 1.3 * 0 
-10 -.29 * .0124 -.13 * .024* 1.3 * .015* 
-11 -.57 * -.013 -.44 * .023* .09 * .009* 
-12 -.18 * .0075 -.0015* .087* .03 * .063* 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE VII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SGAM FOR BANK 2 
Liabilit~ on Asset Cate~or~ 
NDDB2 SAVDB2 TNSB2 NDDB2 SAVDB2 TNSB2 
on on on on on on 
Time CCB2 CCB2 CCB2 TSB2 TSB2 TSB2 
Period X lQ-2 X lQ-2 
11 .• ~4* .02 * .21 * .618* 1.2* .. 178* 
10 .• 55* .1 *' .25 * .609* -2.1 * .162* 
9 .57* .12 * .27 * .598* .5 * .155* 
8 .54* -.225* .23 * .628* 2.35* .183* 
7 .52* .05 * . 22 ·* .66 * 1. 75* .22 * 
6 .48* .08 * .175* .647* -1.55* .208* 
5 .48* .025* .175* .657* -1. 75* .219* 
4 .44* -.09 * .14 * .653* .25* .214* 
3 .54* '• .07 ·* . 23 * .639* 1. 73* .2 * 
2 .15* \ ~as * -.12 * .682* 2.34* .25 * 
1 • 38* .08 * .1 . * .671* 1.2* . 239* 
0 .7 * -.055* • 4 . * .627* .48* .195* 
-1 • 3 * -.225* .02 .61 * -.1 * .179* 
-2 .41* -.3;35* .15 * .6 * -1.7 * .171* 
-3 .54* -.165* .27 * .59 * .65* .159* 
-4 .6 * .11 * .31 * .598* -1.3 * .162* 
-5 .22* -.125* -.07 * .583* 1.48* .155* 
-6 .• 49* .08 * • 2 . * .57 * 2 * .138* 
-7 .24* .• 02 * -.05. * .592* .2 * .159* 
-8 .25* -.045* -.os * .579* -.8 * .142* 
-9 .19* .02 * -.11 * .52 * .49* .088* 
-10 -.01 .07 * -.31 * .583* 1 * .123* 
-11 .48* .06 * .17 * .549* -.4 * .108* 
-12 • 3 * -.105* -.02 .578* -1.3 * .139* 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE VIII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SGAM FOR BANK 3 
Liabilit~ on Asset Categor~ 
NDDB3 SAVDB3 TNSB3 NDDB3 SAVDB3 TNSB3 
on on on on on on 
Time CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 
Period X .10-2 x 1o-2 
11 -1.2 * -.006* -.005 ··* -.138* -.1 * -.09 * 
10 -1. 22* .005* -.0005* -.072* -.51* -.032* 
9 -.32* .01 * . 0038* -.044* .1 * .002 
8 -.6 * -.042* -.0001 -.055 -.03* .04 * 
7 -1. 47* -.01 * -.0082* -.11 * .01* -.06 * 
6 -.75* -.006* -.001 -.085* -.2 * -.042* 
5 -.28* -.006* .004 * -.08 * -.18* -.038* 
4 -.2 * .01 * -.0132* -.098* -.14* -.052* 
3 -1. 47* -.01 * -.0091* -.04 * -.46* -.01 
2 -1. 22* -.01 * -.008 * -.118* -.41* -.08 * 
1 -.9 * -.18 * -.0007* -'. 095* -.36* -.06 * 
0 -1.41* -.07 * -.018 * -.152* -.11* -.11 * 
-1 -2.22* -.06 * -.0175* -.165* .04* -.115* 
-2 -2.1 * -.008* -.016 * -.172* -.29* -.125* 
-3 -2.1 * -.01 * -.0147* -.172* -.16* -.13 * 
-4 -2.2 * -.001* -.015 * -.165* -.05* -.12 * 
.:..s -1.46* -.032* -.0082* -.125* -.19* -.08 * 
-6 -1.8 * .003* -.0117* -.073* -.12* -.025* 
-7 -1.8 * .001* -.0117* -.102* -.05* -.055* 
-8 -1.7 * .003* -.011 * -.1 * .01* -.051* 
-9 -. 8 * -.06 * -.002 -.08 * -.16* -.03 * 
-10 -1.8 * .013* -.011 * -.097* -.31* -.051* 
-11 -1. 26* .048* -.005 * -.122* -.01* -.072* 
-12 -2.07* -.04 * -.014 * -.156* .15* -.11 * 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE IX 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SGAM FOR BANK 4 
Liabilit~ on Asset Catesor~ 
NDDB4 SAVDB4 TNSB4 NDDB4 SAVDB4 TNSB4 
on on on on on on 
Time CCB4 CCB4 CCB4 TSB4 TSB4 TSB4 
Period X 10-2 
11 .2 * 0 .002 * -.075* 1.6* -.06 * 
10 .6 * .04* .0058 * .015 -2.2* .025* 
9 .59 * -.33* .0055 * -.015 -2.4* .01 
8 .3 * .09* .0029 * .04 * -1 * .045* 
7 .08 * 0 .0005 * .07 * -1.2* .07 * 
6 .12 * .06* -.0015 * .01 -1.2* 0 
5 .41 * -.29* .0039 * .015 _l * .012* 
4 -.6 * . 33* -.006 * -.1 * 1.1* -.12 * 
3 -.38 * .OS* -.004 * -.125* 1.9* -.13 * 
2 -.3 * -.1 * -.003 * -.14 * -.2* -.155* 1 -.2 * -.16* -.002 * -.11 * -1.6* -.12 * 
0 -.12 * 0 -.001 * -.06 * -.9* -.075* 
-1 .35 * .09* .0035 * -.11 * 1 * -.12 * 
-2 -.3 * .19* -.0028 * -.125* -1 * -.13 * 
-3 0 -.15* 0 -.12 * -.9* -.125* 
-4 -.405* .18* -.004 * -.045* .6* -.04 * 
:....s -.02 * -.01* -.0002 * . ·.075* .1* .075* 
-6 .07 * 0 .001 * -.015 .2* 0 
-7 .53 * -.34* .0059 * .1 * -2.6* .11 * 
-8 0 0 .0002 * .03 * -. 7* .05 * 
-9 .1 * • 3 * .0015 * .175* .9* .19 * 
-10 -.07 * -.08* -.0002 * .085* 1.9* .11 * 
-11 -. 72 * .11* -.007 -3 * .015 4.3* .05 * 
-12 -.34 * .03* -3.3 X 10 * .005 .5* .025* 
*Indicates coefficients that are signifi~;ant at the 5% level. 
significant. The implication is that perhaps a longer lead-lag time 
2 period should be used for this particular designation of the model. 
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All of the significant coefficients for banks 1 and 3 are negative. 
All of the significant coefficients for bank 2 are positive. Bank 4's 
significant coefficients are half positive and half negative. The 
positive coefficients of bank 2 indicate that as net demand deposits 
increase or decrease, coin and currency for this bank moves in the same 
direction. This indicates that for bank 2 some of the funds which flow 
into the bank through net demand deposits are held for some time in the 
form of coin and currency. The negative coefficients for banks 1 and 3 
indicate that coin and currency for these two banks move in the opposite 
direction of net demand deposits. Funds flowing in as net demand 
deposits in these two banks are not held long, i.e., less than one week, 
in the coin and currency category. For bank 4, the coefficients for lag 
periods 11 through 5 are positive. For lag period 4 through lead period 
12, 11 of the 15 significant coefficients are negative. Bank 4 could 
build its coin and currency account in period t to a desired level from 
the inflows from net demand deposits for the t-N periods when the 
coefficients are positive. Once the coin and currency account is at a 
desired level the funds from net demand deposits in the periods with 
negative coefficients are channeled more quickly into other asset accounts. 
Savings Deposits on Coin and Currency. This representation of the 
SGAM model shows banks 2, 3, and 4 with significant lead and lag 
2spectral analysis was used to determine the necessary lead-lag 
period. This result suggests that spectral analysis might not be that 
accurate a predictor of the lead-lag relationship. 
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coefficients. As with the previous representation of this model the 
significant lag coefficients were expected and the significant lead 
Ctlt!!fficients were not. The explanations for the significant lead and 
lag coefficients in this design of the model are the same as those given 
for the NDD on CC representation of this model. This representation of 
the model for bank 1 shows only two significant coefficients. One is a 
10 period lag coefficient, the other is the coefficient in time period 
0, i.e., neither a lead nor a lag coefficient. The representation for 
bank 1 has no significant lead coefficients. 
This representation of the model for bank 1 indicates that savings 
deposits are not ~ strong source of funds for coin and currency. For 
bank 3, 16 of 22 significant coefficients are n~agative. This indicates 
that for bank 3, funds from savings deposi.ts either are not channeled or 
do not stay for long periods in coin and currency. Bank 2 has 15 of 24 
significant coefficients positive. Bank 4 has 11 of 19 significant 
coefficients positive. The majority of positive coefficients for these 
two banks indicate that funds from savings deposits do flow into and are 
retained for some period of time in coin and currency. 
Total Net Demand Deposits and Savings Deposits on Coin and Currency. 
This form of the SGAM model shows significant lead and lag coefficients for 
all four banks. The significance of the lead coefficients was not anticipated. 
The significance of the lag coefficients was anticipated. The explanation of 
the significant lead and lag coefficients is the same for this representation of 
the model as it was for the NDD on CC representation of the model. 
The signs of most of the significant coefficients for all four banks 
in this representation of the model are the same as the signs of the 
significant coefficients for all four banks in the NDD on CC 
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representation of the model. The explanation for this similarity is 
that net demand depos·its dominate the total series, i.e., net demand 
deposits plus savings deposits. The explanation of the results for 
this representation of the model is the same as the explanation of the 
results for the NDD on CC form of the model. 
Net Demand Deposits on Treasury Securities. Both significant lead 
and lag coefficients were found far all four banks using this representa-
tion of the SGAM model. As with previous representations, the signifi-
cant lag coefficients for all banks were anticipated; the significant 
lead coefficients were not. Explanations for the significant lead and 
lag coefficients for this representation of the model are the same as 
those given for the NDD on CC representation of this model. 
Two attributes of this representation for bank 1 are worth men-
tioning. First, all of the coefficients for bank 1 are significant. 
This indicates that a longer lead-lag structure for this particular 
representation of the model and for this particular bank might be in 
~i 
order. Second, 22 of the 24 coefficients are positive. This shows that 
the funds which come into the bank through net demand deposits do, in 
some form, flow into and stay within bank l's treasury securities. This 
result has further significance when compared with the results of the 
NDD on CC representation for bank 1. All.of the significant coefficients 
for the NDD on CC representation for bank 1 are negative. This indicated 
that if funds from net demand deposits flowed into the bank as coin and 
currency that these funds did not stay long in the coin and currency 
account, i.e., less than a week. It is quite probable, and the 
coefficients of the two models substantiate this, that net demand 
deposits flowing in the bank in the form'of coin and/or currency are 
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quickly transferred to some type of treasury security by bank 1. 
For bank 2 all of the coefficients are significant and positive. 
The significance of all of the coefficients has the same implication 
as it did for bank 1. The fact that all the coefficients are positive 
indicates that funds from net demand deposits flow into and stay within 
the treasury securities account for bank 2. This representation and the 
NDD on CC representation both provide all positive coefficients. This 
indicates that funds from net demand deposits flow into and stay within 
these two asset accounts, i.e., coin and currency and treasury securities, 
for bank 2. 
Bank 3 yields'results which are the exact opposite of bank 2's, i.e., 
all of the significant coefficients are negative. These results are the 
same as those obtained for the NDD on CC representation of this model. 
The implication of all negative coefficients is the same for this 
representation of the model as it was for the NDD on CC representation 
for bank 3, i.e., funds may flow from net demand deposits into treasury 
securities, but if they do, they do not stay in the treasury security 
category very long. 
This representation of the model for bank 4 yielded 10 of 17 
significant coefficients which were negative~ Unlike the first three 
banks, the signs of bank 4's coefficients come in no specific order. 
Any specific conclusions about the flow of funds for bank 4 would not be 
relevant. It does generally appear, however, that funds do not flow 
consistently from net demand deposits to treasury securities~ 
Savings Deposits on Treasury Securities. All of the banks using 
this specification of the SGAM model displayed significant lead and lag 
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coefficients. The explanation for these significant lead and lag 
coefficients is the same as that given for the lead and lag coefficients 
of the NDD on CC specification of this model. 
All of the coefficients are significant for banks 1, 2, and 4. 
This indicates that a longer lead-lag period might be appropriate for 
this representation of the model. 
Nineteen of 24 significant coefficients for bank 1 are positive. 
This conflicts significantly with the SAVD on CC representation of this 
model in which only two of the coefficients are significant, and both 
of them are negative. The SAVD on CC representation shows that funds 
from savings deposits which do flow into the coin and currency category 
do not stay in the category very long. This representation of the model 
shows that funds from savings deposits do flow into treasury securities 
and stay there for some time. 
Bank 2 has 16 of 24 significant coefficients positive. This indi-
cates that funds from savings deposits do flow into and stay within 
treasury securities. 
The majority of bank 3's significant coefficients are negative, 
i.e., 18 of 21. This result indicates that for bank 3 funds which flow 
into treasury securities from savings deposits that they do not stay 
very long in the account. 
Bank 4 has 12 of 24 significant coefficients positive. There is 
no order among the significant coefficients, i.e., no positive or negative 
coefficient patterns emerge. No meaningful statements about funds flow 
from saving deposits to treasury securities for bank 4 can be made. 
Total Net Demand and Savings Deposits on Treasury Securities. This 
designation of the SGAM model indicates significant lead and lag 
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coefficients for all four banks. The explanation for these significant 
lead and lag coefficients is the same as the explanation given for both 
lead and lag coefficients for the NDD on CC representation of the model. 
For banks 1 and 2, almost all of the significant coefficients are 
positive for each bank. The coefficient patterns for these two banks 
are very similar to the patterns for the NDD on TS and SAVD on TS 
designs of this model. The results of the current representation of the 
SGAM model for these two banks appear to provide no new information which 
was not already provided in the NDD on TS and SAVD on TS representation 
of the model. 
The current representation for bank 3, like that for banks 1 and 2, 
provides little new information which is not already provided by the 
NDD on TS and SAVD on TS designs of this model. The difference between 
bank 3 and banks 1 and 2 for this design of the model is that the 
majority, 21 of 22, of the significant coefficients for bank 3 are 
negative. 
For bank 4 this description of the model looks much more like the 
NDD on TS representation than then SAVD on TS representation. Net 
demand deposits so dominate the TNS category for bank 4 that the results 
for the NDD on TS and TNS on TS representations of the model are almost 
identical. As with the previous three banks this representation of the 
model provides no new information not provided by previous designs. 
Conclusions About the SGAM Model. In reviewing the six representa-· 
tiona of the SGAM model, no one representation appears to be better for 
all banks than any other representation. All of the representations 
appear to be bank dependent, i.e., the rankings of the representations 
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depend upon which bank is being considered. The only clear result is 
that when the total of net demand deposits and savings deposits is used 
as the liability category, no new insight is obtained. This lack of 
new insight is the result regardless of whether coin and currency or 
treasury securities is used as the asset category. 
Results of the SFM Model 
This model has one liability and two asset categories. The one 
liability is the total of net demand, savings and time deposits. The 
two asset categories, which are held to be short-term assets, are coin 
and currency and treasury securities. The one liability and two asset 
categories allow for two representations, and their coefficients are 
presented in Tables X-XIII. Starting with Table X, each table displays 
the results for one bank. The Tables X-XIII correspond with the results 
for banks 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
The Total of Net Demand, Savings and Time Deposits on Coin and 
Currency. All four banks have significant lead and lag coefficients. 
As with previous models the lag coefficients are anticipated, the lead 
coefficients are not. The significant lag coefficients indicate that 
there are sources of funds which find a use in the coin and currency 
account. The significant lead coefficients indicate that each bank's 
coin and currency account in period t is dependent upon anticipated 
deposits in periods t+N. 
Bank 1 has only three significant coefficients. One is lag and 
two are lead. All these are negative which indicates that the funds 
which flow into coin and currency from net demand, savings and time 
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TABLE X 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SFM FOR BANK 1 
Liabilit~ on Asset Category 
TNSTBl TNSTBl 
on on 
Time CCB1_2 TSBl 
Period X 10 
11 -.12 .028* 
10 .03 .041* 
9 .23 .012* 
8 -.08 -.05 * 
7 -.08 -.07 * 
6 -.04 -.004* 
5 -.08 .as * 
4 .12 .039* 
3 -.15 .015* 
2 -.3 * .028* 
1 -.18 .019* 
0 -.07 .005* 
-1 -.4 * .019* 
-2 -.02 -.001* 
-3 .1 -.012* 
-4 .01 .021* 
-5 -.01 .042* 
-6 .01 .01 * 
~7 -.07 -.015* 
-8 -.07 -.018* 
-9 -.01 .008* 
-10 .13 .01 * 
-11 -.32* -. 008* 
-12 .14 .03 * 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE XI 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SFM FOR BANK 2 
Liability on Asset Category 
TNSTB2 TNSTB2 
on on 
Time CCB2_2 TSB2 
Period X 10 
11 .045* .052* 
10 .1 * .037* 
9 .16 * .01 * 
8 .13 * .022* 
7 .045* .054* 
6 .05 * .042* 
5 .075* .035* 
4 -.01 * .039* 
3 .075* .035* 
2 -.21 * .08 * 
1 .03 * .053* 
0 .11 * .007* 
-1 -.3 * .02 * 
-2 .12 * .03 * 
-3 .16 * .039* 
-4 .28 * .055* 
-5 -.01 * .045* 
-6 .08 * .024* 
-7 .03 * .039* 
-8 .02 * .042* 
-9 -.07 * -.011* 
-10 -.25 * 0 
-11 .03 * 0 
-12 -.15 * .026* 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE XII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SFM FOR BANK 3 
Liability on Asset Category 
TNSTB3 TNSTB3 
Time on on 
Period CCB3 TSB3 
11 .004 * 0 
10 -.0022* .004 
9 .0016 .007 
8 .0005 .01 * 
7 -.0002 -.014* 
6 .0009 -:-.• 008 
5 .0016 -.002 
4 -.0007 -.008 
3 -.0028* .022* 
2 .001 .009 
1 .0025* .03 * 
0 .0175* .069* 
-1 .002 * .014* 
-2 .0012 .005 
-3 .0012 .005 
-4 -.001 .01 * 
-5 .0.02 * .028* 
;..6 .0032* .058* 
-7 .0017* -.013* 
-8 -.0035* -.01 
-9 .001 -.013* 
-10 -.0002 -.013* 
-11 -.001 -.005 
-12 -.002 * .002 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE XIII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SFM FOR BANK 4 
Liability on Asset Category 
TNSTB4 TNSTB4 
on on 
Time CCB4_2 TSB4 
Period X 10 
11 -.11* -.1 * 
10 .37* .02 * 
9 .12* -.03 * 
8 .29* .01 * 
7 .09* 0 
6 .01* -.051* 
5 .07* -.045* 
4 -.7 * -.1 * 
3 -.26* -.05 * 
2 -.1 * 0 
1 .29* .12 * 
0 -.13* .23 * 
-1 .44* .2 * 
-2 -.29* .05 * 
-3 .2 * -.09 * 
-4 .05* -.17 * 
-5 0 -.1 * 
-6 .1 * -.1 * 
-7 .07* .095* 
-8 -.3 * .02 * 
-9 -.04* .095* 
-10 .19* -.025* 
-11 -.41* -.055* 
-12 -.1 * -.03 * 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
deposits do not stay in coin and currency for a significant, i.e., 
longer than one week, period of time. 
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All but one of the coefficients for banks 2 and 4, respectively, 
are significant. This fact suggests that a lead-lag structure of 
longer than 12 periods might provide a better representation of the SFM 
model for these two banks. The majority of coefficients for both banks 
are positive indicating that funds from total net demand, savings and 
time deposits do stay in the coin and currency account for a period of 
time greater than one week. There is no specific pattern for the signs 
of the coefficients for these two banks. 
Bank 3 has 10 significant coefficients, four of which are negative. 
This bank's significant coefficients form no specific pattern as to size 
or sign. No specific statements about this rep~esentation for this bank 
can be made. 
The Total of Net Demand, Savings and Time Deposits on Treasury 
Securities. This representation of the SFM model has significant lead 
and lag coefficients for all four banks. As with the previous representa-
tion the significant lag coefficients were expected; the significant 
lead coefficients were not. The explanation for both is the same as for 
the previous representation. 
Banks 1 and 2 have all or almost all of their coefficients signifi-
cant which indicates that for this representation of the model.for these 
two banks a longer lead-lag structure might be more appropriate. 
Bank 1 has 15 of 24 significant coefficients positive. It appears 
that funds from total net demand, savings and time deposits flow into 
treasury securities and stay within treasury securities for longer than 
one week's time. This representation of the SFM model for bank 1 when 
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compared to the TNST on CC representation for bank 1 shows that funds 
from net demand, savings and time deposits stay longer in treasury 
sacurities than in coin and. currency. 
Bank 2 has 21 of 22 significant coefficients positive. This indi-
cates that for bank 2 funds from net demand, savings and time deposits 
do flow into and stay within treasury securities. This representation 
of the model compared with the TNST on CC representation for this bank 
shows that funds from the TNST deposit category flow into both coin and 
currency and treasury securities for periods of time greater than one 
week. 
The results from this representation for bank 3 are very much the 
same as the results from the TNST on CC representat~on of this model. 
Six of the 10 significant coefficients are positive. There is no pattern 
to the signs of the coefficients and, therefore, no specific statements 
about this representation for this bank can be made. 
Bank 4 has 13 of 21 significant coefficients negative. However, by 
far the largest of the coefficients are positive. With this representa-
tion for this bank it would be very hard to determine, simply by looking 
at the significant coefficients, the relationship between total net 
demand, savings and time deposits and treasury securities. 
Conclusions About the SFM Model. The results for this model are 
certainly bank dependent. Banks 3 and 4 do not create any pool of cash 
- 3 
or near cash assets. The results for both banks for both representations 
are at best difficult to interpret. Bank 2 looks like the only bank where 
3Assuming that coin and currency and treasury securities are an 
appropriate measure of the bank's cash and near cash assets. 
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a positive change in total net demand, savings and time deposits, coin-
cides with a positive change in both coin and currency and treasury 
securities. Bank 1 does not put its funds which flow into the bank with 
a change in net demand, savings and other time deposits into coin and 
currency for a significant length of time. This bank does appear, 
however, to channel some of the funds jnflow from the deposits into 
treasury securities. 
A comparison of the dollar amounts of the changes in total net 
demand, savings and other time deposits to the dollar amounts of the 
changes for coin and currency plus treasury securities confirms that 
none of the four banks is placing more than approximately 50 percent 
of these deposit inflows into both asset categories. The only banks 
which could be creating a pool of funds are bank 2 and maybe bank 1. 
The above comparisons indicate that-while some of the deposit inflows 
move into one or both of these asset categories for the two banks, there 
is still enough of the inflows, i.e., approximately 50 percent, which 
do not flow into what this study is calling cash and near cash assets 
to indicate a lack of the total pooling of funds. 
Results of the SCAM Model 
The data for this model differ from that used for the previous 
three models. For this model the data for the liability categories have 
been filtered so that only the short-term component of each deposit 
category will be compared with the asset category. 
For this model six liability and two asset categories are used to 
create 12 different representations of the SCAM model. The two asset 
categories, coin and currency and treasury securities, are used because 
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they represent the short-term asset categories of each bank. The six 
liability categories: net demand deposits; savings deposits; other time 
deposits; total net demand, savings and other time deposits; and total 
net demand and other time deposits are used because a short-term component 
for each liability category is a potential source of funds for the short-
4 term assets. 
The coefficients for these representations are presented in Tables 
XIV-XVII. Table XIV gives the results of the 12 representations of this 
model for bank 1. Table XV gives the results of the 12 representations 
of this model for bank 2. Bank· 3.' s results of the 12 representations 
are shown in Table XVI. Table XVII gives the results of the 12 repre-
sentations for bank 4. As with the previous models, each representation 
presented will show the results for all four banks. 
The Short Term Component of Net Demand Deposits on Coin and Currency. 
This representation of the model for bank 1 has 14 of 23 coefficients 
positive. There is no specific pattern for either the positive or nega-
tive coefficients. Both lead and lag coefficients are significant. The 
lag coefficients were expected to be significant, the lead coefficients 
were not. The significance of the lag coefficients is explained as a 
source of funds finding a use. This is to say that the change in the 
short term component of net demand deposits in period t-N provides funds 
which are used in coin and currency in period t. The significance-of 
the lead coefficients is explained by anticipation. The coin and 
4The total of savings and other time deposits is the only combination 
of the liability categories which is not used. The other three combina-
tions of the liability categories which are used should give sufficient 
evidence of this type activity by any of the banks. 
TABLE XIV 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SCAM FOR BANK 1 
Liabilitl on Asset Categorl 
~"DDSBl · SAVDSBl. TNSSBl TNSTSBl TNTSBl NDDSBl OTDSBl SAVDSBl TNSSlH - TSTSBl TNSTSBl OTDSBl 
on on on on on on on on on on on on 
Time CCBl CCBl CCBl CCBl CCBl TSBl TSBl TSBl TSBl TSBl TSBl CCBl 
Period X 10-2 x 10-2 x 10-3 x lo-3 X 10-2 
11 .37* -.06 * -.026 * .008* .008* -;015 * .001 .12* .. 0015 .003* .001 .057* 
10 -.32* .13 -.04 * -.25 * -.3 * -.045 * -.011 .1 * .0025* -.001 0 -.035* 
9 • 3 * -.047* -.085 * -.52 * -.58 * -.08 * -.012 -.5 * -.019 * -.011* -.008 * -.051* 
8 -.05* .019* .09 * .55 * .59 * -.01 * -.009 .2 * -.022 * -.022* -.013 * -.075* 
7 .39* -.041* 0 .005* .05 * .013 * .002 .75* .047 * .035* .023 * .17 * 
6 -.3 * -.001 .01 * ...;...002* -.002* .0625* .00175* .6 * .025 * .034* .016 * .04 * 
5 .15* -.04 * -.035 * -.25 * -.23 * -.022 * .00175* • 35* -.02 * -.021* -.013 * -.1 * 
4 -.09* -.32 * 0 0 0 -.015 * -.004 .3 * 0 -.003* .0017 -.1 * 
3 .2 * .01 -.160 * -.65 * -.67 * -.008 * -.016 . 3 * .• 005 * .002* .0035* .135* 
2 -.23* -.32 * .OS * .1 * .1 * .008 * -.008 . 39* ,.009 * .012* .0055* .07 * 
1 .22* -.32 * .088 * .39 * .4 * -.015 * .012 .2 * -.031 * -.034* -.019 * -.051* 
0 .61* .063* .09 * .6 * .62 * -.012 * .0018 * 1.3* .03 * -.029* .0148* .05 * 
-1 .-15* -.018* .124 * .63 * .7 * .018 * 0 -.9 * .015 * .011* .0075* .1 * 
-2 .31*. -.041* -.03 * -.2 * -.2 * -.02 * .0075 1.25* -.015 * -.011* -.006 * -.025* 
-3 -.2 * .07 * -.09 * -.58 * -.6 * .01 * .024 * -.1 * -.017 * -.011* -.0075* -.085* 
-4 .1 * -.15 * -.076 * -.45 * -.5 * -.025 * -.013 .75* .004 * -.003* -.001 -.03 * 
-5 -.08* .07 * .015 * .19 * .19 * -.022 * -.0055 -. 35* -.005 * -.003* -.003 * .04 * 
-6 .41* -.03 * .06 * . 41 * • 42 * -.05 * -.015 .1 * -.015 * -.005* -.0055* .051* 
-7 -.3 * -.021* .055 * .1 * .13 * -.03 * -.0025 .4 * .014 * .015* -.009 * .045* 
-8 .2 * -.018* -.0355* -.19 * -.19 * .035 * .001 .4 * .001 -.003* -.0017 -.052* 
-9 -.1 * -.02 * -.11 * -.5 * -.52 * -.01 * -.0045 .55* .028 * .02 * .012 * -.05 * -10 .11* -.12 -.01 * .005* .008* -.028 * .0045 .05* -.011 * -.004* -.005 * .02 * 
-11 .11* -.021* .025 * .1 * .1 * -.075 * .0125 -.5 * -.027 * -.027* .0125* .098* 
-12 0 * -.018* .11 * .49 * .5 * .026 * .0045 .7 * .009 * .012* .007 * -.045* 
CXl 
U1 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
TABLE XV 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SCAM FOR BANK 2 
Liabi1itX: on Asset Category 
NDDSB2 SAVDSB2 TNSSB2. TNSTSB2 TNTSB2 NDDSB2 SAVDSB2 TNSSB2. TSTSB2 ·TNSTSB2 OTDSB2·· OTDSB2 
on on on on on on on nn on on on on 
Time CCB2 CCB2 CCB2 CCB2 CCB2 TSB2 TSB2 TSB2 TSB2 TSB2 TSB2 CCB2 
Period x 1o-2 X 10-2 x 10-2 
11 -.003 .2 * -.0035* .15* .12* . 65 -1.5 * .002* .01 * .0025* .018* -.003 
10 .0045 -.32* .01 * .06 -.08* -.2 -1.3 * -.011* -.005 * -.0035* -.007 .03 * 
9 -.0055 .62* -.0046* .22* .25* -.78 -1.65* -.008* -.02 * -.008 * .009 -.01 
8 .004 -.51* -.0082* -.2 * -.16* -1 * -1.9 * -.003* -.01 * -.0045* 0 -.017 
7 -.001 .1 * .014 * .29* .27* .2 -1.48* -.008* .001 * 0 .014* .016 
6 .004 .19* -.0082* -.3 * -.3 * • 85 -1. 28* 0 .0048* .001 * .01 * -.032* 
5 0 -.35* .0043* .2 * .18* .4 -1. 22* .005* 0 .001 * .004 .09 * 
4 -.002 .4 * -.005 * .04 0 -.35 -1.9 * 0 -.017 * -.0055* .004 -.122* 
3 -.003 -.15* .0042* .08* .1 * -.9 -.82* -.002* -.005 * -.0025* -.018* .095* 
2 .002 -.21* -.0025* -.26* -.24* -.55 -1.55* .009* .02 * .009 * -.005 -.042* 
1 .003 .21* -.002 * -.1 * -.1 * .23 -1.1 * .002* .005 * .0025* .063* .02 * 
0 .002 .19* .0058* .42* .37* .6 .13* .028* .016 * .0125* .125* -.013 
-1 -.001 -.19* -.0025* -.11* -.08* 1.25* -1. 55* .04 * .029 * .02 * .04 * .059* 
-2 -.001 .02* .0019* .07 0 .48 -.95* .01 * .011 * .006 * -.005 -.1 * 
-3 -.001 .09* .0002 -.16* -.06 -.25 . -1. 48* -.02 * -.011 * -.009 * .009 .088* 
-4 -.002 -.28* -.0021* -.16* -.21* -1.2 * -1. 48* -.035* -.027 * -.016 * -.02 * -.06 * 
-5 .0047 .3 * .0015* .33* .19* -.1 -1.55* -.014* -.016 * -.0075* .014* .015 
-6 -.0025 -.18* -.0021* -.3 * -.05 1.38* -1. 58* .011* .001 * .0025* .01 * 0 
-7 .005 .16* .0042* .25* .13* 1.17* -1. 29* .011* .014 * .006 * 0 .007 
-8 -.008 -.25* .0019* .22* .22* 1 * -1.2 * 0 .016 * .0048* -.021* -.017 
-9 .016 * .19* -.0075* -.55* -.55* -1.2 * -1.1 * -.014* -.001 * -.0025* -.01 * .01 
-10 -.0035 .02* .0033* .14* .16* -. 7 -1. 81* -.007* -.014 * -.006 * .008 .004 
-11 -.025 * -.09* . 0017* .02 .05 -.1 -1. 35* .007* -.005 * -.001 * -.025* -.003 
-12 .014 -.1 * .002 * .08* -.08* 1.12* -1. 48* .002* .006 * .002 * .028* -.017 




COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SCAM FOR BANK 3 
Liabi1itl on Asset Catesory 
NDDSB3 SAVDSB3 TNSSB3 TNTSB3 TNSTSB3 NDDSB3 SAVDSB3 TNSSB3 TSTSB3 TNSTSB3 OTDSB3 OTDSB3 
on on on on on on on on on on on on 
Time CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 CCB3 TSB3 TSB3 TSB3 TSB3 TSB3 TSB3 CCB3 
Period x 10-2 . X 10-2 
11 .0048 -.18 * .0005 .17* .19 * -.051* 1.2* .013* .003* .003* -.498* -.0005 
10 -.0048 -.1 * -.0047* -.03* .07 * -.047* .75* -.01 * -.004* -.004* -.521* .0025 
9 -.002 -.275* -.0062* -.36* -.36 * -.08 * .11* -.027* -.004* -.007* -.534* -.011 
8 .014 .05 * .0028* -.17* -. 23 * -.09 * .5 * -.015* .003* -.002* -.523* .0025 
7 .024 -.055* .007 * .29* .29 * -.065* .95* .021* .009* .008* - . .§.09* -.004 
6 .001 -.045* .0062* .48* .47 * -.03 * 1 * .024* .005* .006* -.509* .018* 
5 .005 -.19 * -.0052* .05* .1 * -.075* .6 * .012* -.005* 0 -.498* -.004 
4 -.0055 -.255* .001 * -.2 * -.22 * -.075* .75* -.037* -.02 * -.014* -.52 * -.014 
3 .0098 -.025* .0008 -.34* -.35 * -.12 * .8 * -.034* -.015* -.013* -.481* 0 
2 .014 -.025* .0003 .03* .08 * -.07 * .6 * .01 * .002* .003* -.509* 0 
1 .002 -.15 * .0015* .4 * . 39 * .07 * 1.37* .038* .02 * .016* -.9-81* .0045 
0 -.01 -.35 * -.0045* -.1 * -.02 * .13 * 3.4 * .082* .058* .035* -.435* 0 
-1 .005 -.12 * -.0042* -.4 * -.37 * .024* .5 * .033* .022* .014* -.479* -.017* 
-2 .006 -.046* .003 * -.15* -.2 * -.07 * .6 * -.034* -.021* -.015* -.482* -.005 
-3 .0095 -.05 * .0019* .18* .16 * -.085* 1.1* -.041* -.035* -.023* -.49 * .007 
-4 -.004 -.275* -.0041* .11* .1 * -.055* 1 * -.014* -.023* -.013* -.511* .003 
-5 -.0025 -.21 * -.0019* -.03* .1 * -.03 * ._8 * .012* .003* .003* -.545* -.0051 
-6 .015 .01 * .0052* .01* -.09 * -.02 * .6 * .02 * .015* .01 * -.488* -.003 
-7 .02 .07 * .0059* .12* .05 * -.02 * 1.1 * .007* .012* .005* -.514* .005 
-8 .004 -.265* -.003 * .03* .06 * -.03 * 1.1 * .001* 0 0 -.466* .007 
-9 -.008 -.11 * -.0065* -.13* -.1 * -.065* . 8 * -.018* -.014* -.009* -.491* -.0025 
-10 -.004 -.28 * -.0041* -.25* -.15 * -.05 * :s * -.011* -.01 * -.005* -.54 * -.01 
-11 .019 .08 * .0065* .05* -.001* -.055* 1 * -.005* .005* .004* -.495* .002 
-12 .023 .01 * .0082* .24* .19 * -.09 * .6 * .001* .007* .004* -.489* .01 
00 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. -...J 
TABLE XVII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SCAM FOR BANK 4 
Liability on Asset Categor~ 
NDDSB4 SAVSSB4 TNSSB4 TNTSB4 TNSTSB4 NDDSB4 SAVDSB4 TNSSB4 TSTSB4 TNSTSB OTDSB4 OTDSB4 
on on on on on on on on on on on on 
Time CCB4 CCB4 CCB4 CCB4 CCB4 TSB4 TSB4 TSB4 TSB4 TSB4 TSB4 CCB4 
Period x 10-2 X 10-2 x 1o-2 X 10-2 . 
11 -. 82* .17 * -.2 * -.125* -.135* -.025* -2.2 * -.041* -.03 * -.024* .015* -.013 
10 -.47* • 29 * -.11* -.075 -.08 * -.01 * -1 * -.06 * -.019* -.018* -.003 .0052 
9 . 1 * .29 * -.08* .02 .001* . -.03 * 0 -.008* -.009* -.004* -.02 * -.005 
8 -.19* .3 * .29* .15 * .15 *. .11 * -.25* .04 * .015* .014* 0 .0052 
7 -.5 * .17 * .07* .03 .025* -.01 * -1.5 * .03 * .01 * .007* .019* -.011 
6 -.5 * .275* -.11* -.09 -.08 * -.09 * -1.3 * -.019* .001* -.005* -.003 0 
5 -.1 * .31 * -.48* -.225* -.22 *· -.08 * -1.3 * -.21 * -.001* -.005* -.012* .001 
4 -.45* .125* .17* .12 .12 * -.07 * -1.4 * -.21 * -.01 * -.007* -.02 * -.009 3 -.75* .31 * .31* .19 * .. 19 * -.14 * -.8 * -.08 * -.065* -.039* 0 -.015 
2 -.6 * .335* -.55* -.255* -.24 * -.08 * -.8 * .02 * .016* .009* -.022* -.0021 
1 .59* .27 * .05* .02 .001 .1 * -2.8 * .03 * .05 * .024* .005 .008 
0 .79* .34 * .54* .24 * .22 * .08 * 2.7 * .04 * .038* .021* .158* 0 
-1 . 3 * .29 * .54* .26 * .25 * .21 * -.5 * .11 * .058* .044* .11 * .002 
-2 . 39* .25 * -.21* -.055 -.05 * .14 * -.55* .039* .001* .009* -.021* -.004 
-3 -.75* .375* -.38* -.205* -.2 * -.052* -1.5 * -.061* -.048* -.03 * -.038* .0052 
-4 0 .15 * -.37* -.175* -.16 * .-.13 * -1.4 * -.082* -.052* -.035* -.021* -.0062 
-5 -1.1 * .32 * .28* .075 .06 * .03 * -1 * -.011* .014* .004* .019* -.0021 
-6 . 39* .148* .19* .14 * .12 * .05 * -.5 * .061* .032* .028* -.012* -.0028 
-7 -.55* .42 * -.1 * -.01 .0007 0 -.55* .05 * .02 * .019* -.022* -.001 
-8 -.3 * .22 * .12* .04 .035* -.05 * -2 * -.037* -.02 * -.015* -.034* -.0025 
-9 -.35* .11 * -.35* -.21 * -.2 * 0 -.55* -.08 * -.039* -.029* -.003 -.001 
-10 -.62* .37 * -.02* -.04 -.04 * .08 * -.75* -.019* -.001* -.001* -.012* -.013 
-11 .19* .275* .19*' .1 .09 * .07 * -.01* .092* .035* .032* -.02 * .0053 
-12 -.01 .275* .35* .17 * .17 * .07 * -.03* .042* .008* .009* .012* .0013 
00 
00 
*Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
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currency held by the bank in period t depends on the anticipated change 
in the short term component of net demand deposits in periods t+N. 
It is interesting to remember that this representation of the SGAM 
model has all negative coefficients. This indicated that bank 1 did not 
leave the funds from total net demand deposits in the form of coin and 
currency for very long. Now, with this representation of the SCAM model, 
a majority of the coefficients are positive. This indicates that the 
short-term component of net demand deposits is correlated in a positive 
manner with coin and currency, i.e., the short-term component of net. 
demand deposits does stay within coin and currency for a significant 
period of time. 
Bank 2 for this representation has only two lead coefficients which 
are significant. One is positive the other negative. It is obvious, 
for these results, that the short-term component of net demand deposits 
has no significant relationship with this bank's coin and currency. 
This representation for the SGAM model, however, has 23 positive, signifi-
cant ·coefficients. This indicates that for bank 2 it is the total net 
demand deposit category which correlates well with coin and currency. 
This representation for bank 3 shows all coefficients to be insig-
nificant. This indicates that no relationship between the short-term 
component of net demand deposits and coin and currency exists for bank 3. 
The results from this representation for this model go beyond the results 
from this representation for the SGAM model. This representation for 
the SGAM model provided 24 significant negative coefficients. This 
indicates that a negative relationship exists which in turn implies that 
the funds from net demand deposits do not stay within the coin and cur-
rency account for a significant period of time. This representation for 
the SCAM model goes beyond a negative relationship and indicates that 
for the short-term component there exists no relationship at all. 
Bank 4 has 22 significant coefficients, 15 of which are negative. 
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There are no discernible patterns in the coefficients. Any interpre-
tation is therefore mere conjecture. This corresponds with the results 
for this representation of this bank for the SGAM model. The results 
from this representation of the SGAM model are also unclear. 
The Short Term Component of Savings Deposits on Coin and Currency. 
All four banks for this representation of the model have significant 
lead and lag coefficients. The significant lag coefficients were anti-
cipated. The significant lead coefficients were not anticipated. The 
explanation for the significance of both the lead and lag coefficients 
is the same as that presented for the previous representation. 
For this representation, bank 1 has 20 significant coefficients, 
15 of which are negative. The negative relationship for this representa-
tion indicates that funds from the short-term component of savings 
deposits do not stay within coin and currency for a significant length 
of time, i.e., longer than a week. In comparing this representation 
to the previous one, i.e., NDDS on CC, it appears that for the SCAM model 
for this bank that coin and currency is more closely related to the 
short-term component of net demand deposits than to the short-term 
component of savings deposits. 
Bank 2 has 22 significant coefficients. Eleven are negative. There 
is no discernible pattern to either the positive or negative coefficients. 
Any explanation of this representation of the model for bank 2 would only 
be speculation. Comparing this design of the model to.the previous 
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design, i.e., NDD on CC, shows that for the current design a significant 
relationship does exist but is not explainable; while for the previous 
representation no significant relationship even existed. 
Bank 3 has 22 significant coefficients, 19 of which are negative. 
This implies that the short-term component of savings deposits for bank 
3 does not remain in the form of coin and currency for very long. 
Comparing this representation of the SCAM model to this representation 
of the SGAM.model shows that for bank 3 neither the short-term component 
of savings deposits nor total savings deposits remain in coin and 
currency for very long, i.e. , more than one ~veek. 
For bank 4, all 24 coefficients are significant and positive. With 
all of the coefficients being significant, it i13 possible that a longer 
lag structure is needed for bank 4. The previous representation for 
this model, i.e., NDDS on CC, has a majority of negative significant 
coefficients. This indicates that for bank 4 the funds from the short-· 
term component of net demand deposits do not stay within the coin and 
currency category very long. In contrast, this representation indicates 
that the funds from the short-term component of savings deposits stays 
within the coin and currency category for a longer period. The comparison 
indicates that for bank 4 the short-term component for savings deposits 
is more important in providing coin and currency. 
The Short Term Component of Total Net Demand and Savings Deposits 
on Coin and Currency. This representation of the model yields results 
which are very similar for each of the four banks. All four banks have 
almost one-half of their significant coefficients positive. Each bank 
has between 20 to 24 significant coefficients with 10 to 12 of the 
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coefficients positive. None of the significant coefficients for any of 
the four banks has a particular or distinguishable pattern. An inter-
pretation for any of the four banks would be pure speculation and is 
therefore undesirable. 
All four banks also have significant lead and lag coefficients. 
The signifcant lag coefficients were expected; the significant lead 
coefficients were not. The explanation for having both significant 
lead and lag coefficients for this representation of the model is the 
same as that given for the NDDS on CC representation. 
The results from this representation of the SCAM model yield very 
little information. Comparing these results to the results of this 
representation for the SGAM model, it appears that this representation 
gives much less information than the SGAM model. 
The Short Term Component of Net Demand and Other Time Deposits on 
Coin and Currency. For this representation of the model, banks 1, 2, 
3, and 4 have 22, 18, 24, and 12 significant coefficients, respectively. 
As with the previous representation, each bank has approximately one-
half of its significant coefficients negative. There is no specific 
pattern for the positive or negative coefficients of any of the four 
banks. Bank 3 has all of its coefficients significant. This means that 
a longer lead and lag structure might be a better representation of this 
model for bank 3. However, any attempted interpretation of any of the 
four banks' coefficients would be meaningless. 
All four banks do have significant lead and lag coefficients. As 
with previous representations, the significant lag coefficients were 
anticipated; the significant lead coefficients were not. The explanation 
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for the significant lead and lag coefficients is the same· as that given 
for the NDDS on CC representation of this model. 
The Short Term Component of Total Net Demand, Savings and Other 
Time Deposits on Coin and Currency. This representation of the SCAM 
model yields results very similar to the previous two representations. 
~11 four banks have significant lead and lag coefficients. The signifi-
cant lead coefficients were not anticipated; the significant lag 
coefficients were anticipated. An explanation of both the significant 
lead and lag coefficients is given in the explanation of the NDDS on CC 
representation of this model. 
Banks 1, 2,·3, and 4, have 22, 16, 23, and 21 significant coeffi-
cients, respectively. They also have 13, 10, 13, and 11 of their 
significant coefficients positive, respectively. The positive and 
negative coefficients occur in no specific pattern. Therefore, no 
attempt will be made to interpret the pattern of coefficients for any 
of the four banks. 
The Short Term Component of Net Demand Deposits on Treasury 
Securities. For this representation of the SCAM model, banks 1, 3, and 
4 have both significant lead and lag coefficients. Bank 2 has only 
significant lead coefficients. An explanation of the significant lead 
and lag coefficients is given in the NDDS on CC representation of this 
model. 
Bank 1 has 17 of 24 significant coefficients negative. This implies 
that the short-term component of net demand deposits does not stay within 
the treasury security categories very long for bank 1. When this repre-
sentation of the SCAM model is compared to the NDDS on CC representation 
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with 14 of its 23 significant coefficients positive, it appears that the 
short-term component of net demand deposits is more closely related to 
coin and currency than to treasury securities. Also, when this repre-
sentation is compared to the NDD on TS representation for the SGAM 
model, it indicates that the treasury security category is more closely 
related to the total net demand deposit category than it is to the short-
term component. 
Bank 2 has six significant lead coefficients; four of the six are 
positive. With this few significant coefficients, it appears that for 
bank 2 the short-term component for net demand deposits is not strongly 
related to treasury securities. This result coupled with the result of 
the NDDS on CC representation of this model indicate that the short-term 
component of net demand deposits is not an important input into either 
of the short-term asset categories, i.e., coin and currency or treasury 
securities. This representation of the SGAM model further shows that 
it is the total net demand deposits and not the short-term component 
which is the most significant input into the treasury security category. 
Bank 3 has 19 of 22 significant coefficients negative. This implies 
that funds from the short-term component of net demand deposits do not 
stay within the treasury security category for very long, i.e., longer 
than one week. This result coupled with the result from this representa-
tion for the SGAM model indicate that for bank 3 neither the short-term 
component nor total net demand deposits stay within the treasury security 
category for very long. 
Bank 4 has 22 significant coefficients, 12 of which are negative. 
Nine of the 11 significant lag coefficients are negative while eight of 
the 11 significant lead coefficients are positive. This indicates that 
funds which have already come into the bank through the short-term 
component of net demand deposits do not stay within the treasury 
security category very long. However, anticipated funds from future 
periods from the short-term component of net demand deposits are 
expected to contribute to the treasury security category. 
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The Short Term Component of Savings Deposits on Treasury Securities. 
Banks 1, 2, and 3 in this representation of the model have all 24 
coefficients significant. This implies that for these banks a model 
with longer leads and lags might be more appropriate. 
Also, for this representation, all four banks have both significant 
lead and lag coefficients. An explanation for having both significant 
lead and lag coefficients is given in the NDDS ~n CC representation of 
this model. 
Bank 1 for thisrepresentation has 24 significant coefficients, 19 
of which are positive. This indicates that funds from the short-term 
component of savings deposits stay within the treasury security category 
for longer than one week. This result when compared to the result of 
the SAVDS on CC representation of this model shows that for bank 1 the 
short...;term component of savings deposits remains within the treasury 
security category longer than in the coin and currency category. 
Bank 2 has 23 negative out of 24 significant coefficients. This 
indicates that funds from the short-term component of savings deposits 
do not stay with the treasury security category long enough to indicate 
a positive relationship. This result compared to the result of this 
representation for the SGAM model indicates that the total category of 
savings deposits for bank 2 is more positively related to the treasury 
security than is the short-term component of savings deposits. 
Bank 3 has all 24 of its significant coefficients positive; thus 
irtdicating that the funds from the short-term component of savings 
deposits remain within the treasury security category for a period of 
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time greater than one week. This result compared with the result of the 
SAVDS on CC representation for this model indicates that funds from the 
short-term component of savings deposits remain within treasury securities 
longer than they remain within coin and currency. Also, the results 
from this representation compared with the results of the representation 
for the SGAM model indicate that for bank 3 it is the short term component 
of savings deposi,ts and not total savings deposits which stays within the 
treasury security category the longest. These results are just the 
opposite of those found for bank 2. 
For this representation, bank 4 has 22 significant coefficients. 
Twenty-one of the 22 significant coefficients are negative. This implies 
that funds from the short-term component of savings deposits do not 
remain within the treasury security category for more than one week. 
This result contrasts with the result for the SAVDS on CC representation 
of the model. For bank 4 it appears that funds from the short-term 
component of savings deposits are more positively related to coin and 
currency than to treasury securities. This result is exactly opposite 
of the results found for banks 1 and 3. 
The Short Term Component of Total Net Demand and Savings Deposits 
on Treasury Securities. All four banks for this representation of the 
model have both significant lead and lag coefficients. As with previous 
representations, the significant lead coefficients were not expected. 
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The significant lag coefficients were expected. For an explanation of 
both the significant lead and lag coefficients see the NDDS on CC repre- . 
sentation for this model appearing on page 84. 
Banks 1, 2, 3, and 4 have 21, 20, 22, and 24 significant coeffi-
cients, respectively. All four banks have 11 of their significant 
coefficients positive. None of the positive or negative coefficients 
for any of the banks display a specific pattern or sequence. Because 
none of the banks' significant coefficients have a clear cut pattern or 
sign, any attempt to interpret the results would be mere conjecture. 
Comparing the results for this representation of this model with those 
for this representation for the SGAM model indicate that the total of 
net demand and savings deposits, for banks 1, 2, and 3, has a much 
stronger relationship with treasury securities than does the short-term 
component of net demand and savings deposits. 
The Short Term Component of Other Time Deposits on Treasury 
Securities. For this representation of the model all four banks have 
both significant lead and lag coeffic.ients. As with previous represen-
tations and models the significant lag coefficients were anticipated 
and the significant lead coefficients were not. For an explanation of 
both the significant lead and lag coefficients see the explanation given 
in the NDDS on CC representation of this model appearing on page 84. 
Bank 1 has only four significant coefficients; all of which are 
positive. The four significant coefficients indicate that the short-
term component of other time deposits is, at best, very weakly related 
to treasury securities. 
Bank 2 has 11 significant coefficients, seven of which are positive. 
This indicates that for bank 2 there is a stronger, i.e., stronger than 
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bank l's relationship, relationship between the short-term component of 
other time deposits and treasury securities. 
Bank 3 has all of its coefficients significant and negative indi-
cating that the funds from the short-term component of other time 
deposits do not stay within the treasury security category for a very 
long period of time. These results also indicate that for bank 3 there 
is a strong relationship between the short-term component of other time 
deposits and the treasury security category. Comparing the results of 
this representation of this model with the results of the OTDS on CC 
representation of this model shows that for bank 3 the short-term 
component of other time deposits is much more strongly related to trea-
sury securities than to coin and currency. 
Bank 4 has 13 of 18 significant coefficients negative. This 
indicates that funds from the short-term component of other time 
deposits do not stay within the treasury security category for longer 
than one week. The results also indicate that the negative relationship 
between the short-term component of other time deposits and treasury 
securities is not a very strong one. 
The Short Term Component of Other Time Deposits on Coin and Currency. 
For all practical purposes, this representation of the model has only 
two banks with both significant lead and lag coefficients. Bank 3 has 
only two significant coefficients while all of the coefficients for 
bank 4 are insignificant. The explanation of the significant lead and 
lag coefficients for banks 1 and 2 is the same as that given for the 
significant lead and lag coefficients in the NDDS on CC representation 
of this model. 
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The results for banks 3 and 4 indicate that for these two banks 
there is no relationship between the short-term component of other time 
deposits and coin and currency. Bank 2 has six of 11 significant 
coefficients positive, while bank 1 has 10 of 23 significant coefficients 
positive. Neither of the sets of significant coefficients for banks 1 
or 2 have a specific pattern for the positive or negative coefficients. 
Therefore, no atte~pt is made to interpret the pattern of coefficients 
for banks 1 or 2. 
The Short Term Component of Total Savings and Other Time Deposits 
on Treasury Securities. For this representation of the model all four 
banks have significant lead and lag coefficients. An explanation for 
the existence of both significant lead and lag coefficients is given in 
the NDDS on CC representation of this model. 
Only one of the four banks, for this representation, has results 
which can possibly be interpreted. Banks 1, 2, 3, and 4 have 22, 20, 
23, and 24 significant coefficients, respectively. Fourteen, 10, 10, 
and 11 of these significant coefficients are negative. Only bank 1, 
with 14 of 22 significant coefficients negative, provides results which 
might give some insight into the relationship between the short-term 
component of total savings and other time deposits and treasury 
securities. For bank 1 it appears that funds from the short-term 
component do not stay within the treasury security category very long. 
For the other three banks there are not enough either positive or nega-
tive coefficients nor do the coefficients follow a specific enough 
pattern to allow any interpretation. 
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The Short Term Component of Total Net Demand, Savings and Other 
Time Deposits on Treasury Securities. All four banks for this representa-
tion have significant lead and lag coefficients. As with all previous 
representations the significant lag coefficients were anticipated; the 
significant lead coefficients were not. For an explanation of both the 
significant lead and lag coefficients see the explanation given in the 
NDDS on CC representation of this model. 
None of the four banks for this representation provide results 
which can be interpreted. Bank 1 has eight of 19 positive coefficients. 
Bank 2 has 12 of 22 positive coefficients. Bank 3 has 12 of 22 positive 
coefficients. Bank 4 has 12 of 24 positive coefficients. None of the 
significant coefficients for any of the four banks has a specific 
pattern or sequence which would give some insight into the relationships 
between the short-term component of total deposits and treasury securities. 
Conclusions from the SCAM. The representations for this model pro-
vide three discernable results. First, the short-term component of other 
time deposits provides results which are strictly bank dependent. 
Regardless of the asset category used, the results from an OTDS repre-
sentation are different for each of the four banks. 
Second, the short-term component of the total categories for the 
liabilities, i.e., TNSS, TNTS, TSTS and TNSTS, provides consistent 
results across all banks for a particular asset category. Approximately 
the same number of coefficients are significant in each representation 
involving the short-term component of a total liability category. Also, 
approximately the same number of coefficients have the same sign in each 
representation involving the short-term component of a total liability 
category. 
101 
Third, all other repreaentations besides those already mentioned 
appear to be bank dependent. The SAVDS on CC and SAVDS on TS come the 
closest of the bank dependent representations to having a pattern 
including more than one bank. 
Results of. the LCAM 
This model like the previous one uses filtered data for the deposits. 
In this model, it is the long term, i.e., longer than one year, component 
of each deposit category which is compared with the long term asset 
categories. 
There are 10 representations for this model; five liability cate-
gories, including combinations of the initial liability categories, and 
two asset categories. The five liability categories used are net demand 
deposits, savings deposits, other time deposits, the total of savings 
and other time deposits and the total of net demand, savings and other 
time deposits. The two asset categories used are total loans and other 
securities, i.e. , these are securities other than U. S. treasury 
securities. 
The results for all four banks for each representation of this 
model are shown in Tables XVIII through XXI. The results for bank one 
are displayed in Table XVIII. The results for bank two are shown in 
Table XIX. Bank three's results are presented in Table XX. The results 
for bank four are shown in Table XXI. 
The Long Term Component of Other Time Deposits on Total Loans. All 
four banks for this representation have both significant lead and lag 
coefficients. As with previous models, the significant lag coefficients 
TABLE XVIII 
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LCAM FOR BANK 1 
Liability on Asset Category 
OTDLBl SAVDLBl TSTLBl TNSTLBl OTDLBl SAVDLBl TSTLBl TNSTLBl NDDLBl NDDLBl 
Time on on on on on on on on on on 
Period TLBl TLBl TLBl- TLBl OSBl --OSBl- OSBl OSBl TLBl OSBl 
11 .03 * 1.5 -.1 * -.02 .03* .025* -.04 0 -.16* -.05 * 
10 .03 * .2 -.05 -.06 .05* .02 * 0 -.0125 -.12* -.05 * 
9 .03 * 1.9 -.05 0 .03* .5 * .01 -.01 -.1 * -.03 * 
8 .03 * 0 -.07* .02 .05* .025* -.01 .012 -.05* -.03 * 
7 0 -2.1 -.05 -.06 .03* -.5 * 0 -.02 -.05* -.03 * 
6 .03 * 0 -.07* 0 .05* . 35 * -.01 0 -.05* -.04 * 
5 .03 * -.5 -.07* -.01 .03* 0 -.005 .01 -.02* 0 
4 0 -3 -.05 -.06 .03* -.5 * -.005 -.01 -.01* -.025* 
3 .03 * --3.2 -.1 * -.1 *· .03* -.65 * -.01 -.02 -.32* -.1 * 
2 0 -2 -.07* -.1 * .02* -.55 * -.05 -.03 -.3 * -.11 * 
1 0 4 0 -.1 * -.05* .6 * -.04 .01 . 35* .035* 
0 2.48 * 12.2 1.68* .75* .7 * 3.1 * .44* .188* 1.3* .3 * 
-1 0 4 .2 * .15* -.06* .5 * -.005 .0125 . 39* .045* 
-2 .03 * -2 -.39* 0.18* .05* -.5 * -.09* ...;.,04 -.3 * -.1 * 
-3 .03 * -2.1 -.21* -.13* .05* -.3 * -.05 -.03 -.3 * -.07 * 
-4 .03 * .8 -.07* -.06 .05* .48 * -.005 -.01 -.1 * -.01 * 
-5 .03 * .8 -.07* 0 .03* .4 * -.025 0 -.01* -.03 * 
-6 .03 * -1.8 -.07* -.06 .05* 0 -.005 -.02 0 .01 * 
-7 .03 * 1.5 -.07* -.04 .05* .4 * -.01 -.015 -.08* -.02 * 
-8 .03 * -2.1 0 0 .05* -.24 * 0 .01 -.19* -.07 * 
-9 .03 * -.8 -.05 -.07* .07* 0 0 -.015 .o .025* 
-10 -.0625* -.2 -.1 * -.06 .01* -.01 * -.04 -.015 -.11* -.055* 
-11 .03 * -1.2 -.05 0 .07* -.02 * 0 .01 -.06* -.02 * 
-12 .03 * -.7 -.05 -.02 .05* -.01 * .01 -.01 -.01* -.02 * 




COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LCAM FOR BANK 2 
Liabi1itl on Asset Category 
OTDLB2 SAVDLB2 TSTLB2 TNSTLB2 OTDLB2 SAVDLB2 TSTLB2 TNSTLB2 NDDLB2 NDDLB2 
Time on on on on on on on on on on 
Period TLB2 TLB2 TLB2 TLB2 OSB2 OSB2 OSB2 OSB2 TLB2 OSB2 
11 .2 * 2 * -.01 -.07 -.01* -.15* -.02 -.01 -.15* -.03 * 
10 .25* 1 * -.19 -.01 0 -.15* -.02 -.002 -.21* -.04 * 
9 .2 * 1 * .16 -.05 0 -.15* .03 -.005 --.28* -.02 * 
8 .2 * 1 * -.2 -.05 0 0 -.005 -.002 -.09* -.02 * 
7 .2 * 1 * .2 -.02 0 -.15* 0 -.002 -.21* -.03 * 
6 .25* 2 * -.23 -.05 0 -.15* -.07 -.005 -.1 * -.02 * 
5 .2 * 1 * -.18 -.05 0 -.15* -.005 -.005 - .2. * -.02 * 
4 .25* 2 * .2 -.05 0 -.15* -.005 -.005 -.28* -.03 * 
3 0 -.5* -.41 -.13 0 -.15* -.08 -.021 -.3 * -.07 * 
2 1.1* 9 * .3 .08 0 -.15* -.0[£ -.023 -.08* -.075* 
1 -.48* -6 * -.17 0 .02* 0 .04 .03 0 .07 * 
0 2.59* 27 * 1.58* .65* .59* 5.5 * .38 * .16* 1.42* .37 * 
-1 .5 * 2.5* .54 .24 .03* 0 .07 .05 .05* .09 * 
-2 .2 * 1 * -.37 -.14 -.01* -.15* -.08 -.04 -.4 * -.075* 
-3 .35* 2 * -.21 -.16 .02* -.15* -.04 -.04 -.25* -.05 * 
-4 .25* 1 * .13 -.06 0 -.15* -.005 -.01 -.21* -.04 * 
-5 .25* 2 * -.21 -.01 0 0 -.03 0 -.17* -.025* 
-6 .25* 2 * .1 .01 0 -.15* -.005 .002 -.17* -.02 * 
-7 .35* 1 * -.18 -.01 0 -.15* -.005 -.005 -.17* -.02 * 
-8 .25* 2 * 0 -.05 0 0 0 -.01 -.08* -.01 * 
-9 .25* 1 * -.12 0 0 -.15* -.03 .003 -.21* -.04 * 
-10 .25* 2 * -.18 -.03 0 -.15* -.03 -.006 -.1 * -.02 * 
-11 .25* 2 * 0 -.03 0 -.15* -.005 -.006 -.1 * -.01 * 
-12 .25* 1 * -.08 -.03 0 0 0 -.006 -.21* -.03 * 
I-' 




COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LCAM FOR BANK 3 
Liability on Asset Categorl 
OTDLB3 SAVDLB3 TSTLB3 TNSTLB3 OTDLB3 SAVDLB3 TSTLB3 TNSTLB3 NDDLB3 NDDLB3 
Time on on on on on on on on on on 
Period TLB3 TLB3 TLB3 TLB3 OSB3 OSB3 OSB3 OSB3 TLB3 OSB3 
11 .08* 1.25* -.02 -.01 -.005 -.05* -.008 -.001 0 -.01 * 
10 .02* -.5 * -.055* 0 -.005 -.05* 0 -.001 .05 -.005 
9 -.05* 1.25* .1 * -.01 -.015 0 .01 -.001 -.02 -.01 * 
8 • 35* -.1 * -.16 * -.01 0 -.05* -.008 -.003 0 -.01 * 
7 -.32* . 8 * .2 * -.01 -.06 * -.2 * -.008 -.01 .05 -.01 * 
6 .02* 1. 25* -.23 * -.01 -.025 -.05* -.035 -.012 .15 * .007 
5 .21* -1.4 * -. 04 -.05* .005 -.15* -.008 -.008 .15 * .007 
4 .02* . 8 * .04 -.01 0 -.05* -.008 -.001 -.06 -.035* 
3 .09* 2.5 * -.2 * -.01 -.015 0 -.022 -.003 -.31 * -.075* 
2 -.2 * -3.75* -.1 * -.12* -.027 -.27* -.03 . -.02 -.25 * -.04 * 
1 -.31* -4 * -.32 * -.2 * -.015 -.2 * .042 .035 .19 * .075* 
0 1.39* 19 * 1.33 * .88* .195 * 2.45* .158* .1 1.15 * .18 * 
-1 .1 * -3.75* -.1 * -.1 * .048 * -1. 25* .039 .023 .4 * .065* 
-2 -.1 * -4 * -.25 * -.15* .005 -.4 * -.024 -.019 -.35 * -.005 
-3 .1 * 2.5 * -.09 * -.04 -.015 -.1 * -.036 -.021 .005 -.05 * 
-4 -.1 * .8 * 0 * 0 -.036 * -1. 25* -.015 -.01 -.001 -.02 * 
-5 -.07* -.8 * .07 * 0 -:-.025 -.1 * .01 -.003 .15 * -.01 * 
-6 .19* 0 -.1 * -.01 .02 -.1 * -.015 -.001 0 -.002 
-7 .42* .8 * .07 * 0 .05 * 0 -.005 -.001 .004 -.01 * 
-8 -.21* . 8 * 0 -.01 -.036 * -.1 * -.008 -.003 -.002 -.02 * 
-9 .09* -1.2 * -.02 .02 -.02 ;-.2 * -.008 -.001 .004 -.02 * 
-10 .09* 1.25* -.02 -.04 -.0375* -.2 * -.018 -.01 -.002 -.02 * 
-11 -.25* -.8 * -.05 * 0 -.036 * -.1 * -.01 -.001 -.002 -.02 * 
-12 .2 * 0 -.05 * -.02 -.015 -.1 * 0 -.003 .009 -.01 * 
1-' 




COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LCAM FOR BANK 4 
Liability on Asset Category 
OTDLB4 SAVDLB4 TSTLB4 TNSTLB4 OTDLB4 SAVDLB4 TSTLB4 TNSTLB4 NDDLB4 NDDLB4 
Time on on on on on on on on on on 
Period TLB4 TLB4 TLB4 TLB4 OSB4 OSB4 OSB4 OSB4 TLB4 OSB4 
11 -.025* -.4* -.03 -.02 0 -.045* -.01 -.003 -.04* 0 
10 -.05 * -.2* -.03 -.02 -.003* -.045* -.005 -.003 -.12* -.02 * 
9 -.025* -.2* .11 * 0 -.003* -.045* .022 -.002 -.04* .015* 
8 -.05 * -.2* .01 0 -.003* -.045* .001 -.002 -.12* -.025* 
7 -.05 * -.4* -.03 -.01 0 -.045* -.005 -.002 -.09* 0 
6 -.025* -.2* -.09 * 0 0 -.045* -.02 0 0 0 
5 -.05 * -.4* 0 -.01 -.003* -.045* 0 0 -.15* -.02 * 
4 -.025* -.2* -.03 -.01 -.003* -.045* -.005 -.002 0 0 
3 -.19 * -1.9* -.25 * -.06* -.003* -.045* -.045 -.003 -.3 * -.01 * 
2 .04 * .5* -.14 * .01 -.003* -.045* -.024 -.002 -.1 * 0 
1 -.1 * -1.1* .19 * .05 -.003* -.045* .04 .015 -1.5 * 0 
0 1.04 * 10.5* .55 * .45* .225* 2.23 * .12 * .095 1.78* .38 * 
-1 -.05 * -.4* .2 * .08* -.003* -1 * .04 .017 .05* .02 * 
-2 -.05 * -.4* -.12 * -.08* -.003* -.045* -.037 -.018 -.11* -.01 * 
-3 -.05 * -.4* -.12 * -.08* -.003* -.045* -.02 -.018 -.07* -.02 * 
-4 -.05 * -.4* .04 -.04 -.003* -.045* -.001 -.01 -.07* -.01 * 
-5 -.05 * -.4* -.11 * -.03 -.003* -.045* -.018 -.008 -.07* -.01 * 
-6 -.025* -.2* .11 * -.02 0 -.045* .019 -.003 -.07* -.02 * 
-7 -.075* -.4* -.04 -.03 -.003* -.045* -.01 -.005 -.07* 0 
-8 -.025* -.4* 0 -.04 -.003* -.045* 0 -.01 -.1 * -.02 * 
-9 -.015* -.4* -.08 * -.03 -.007* -.045* -.02 -.008 -.07* -.02 * 
-10 -.05 * -.4* -.04 -.05 -.003* -1 * -.01 -.01 -.03* 0 
-11 -.025* -.4* 0 -.03 -.003* -.045* 0 -.008 -.07* -.01 * 
-12 -.075* -.4* -.065 -.03 -.003* -.045* -.01 -.005 -.1 * -.01 * 
I-' 
0 *Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. V1 
106 
were anticipated and the significant lead coefficients were not. The 
significant lag coefficients indicate that the funds flowing into a 
particular long-term asset category at time t depend upon funds which 
have come into the bank through the long-term component of a liability 
category in some period t-N. The significant lead coefficients indicate 
that the funds flowing into a particular long-term asset category at 
time t are also dependent upon the anticipated inflow of funds from the 
long-term component of a particular deposit category in period t+N. So 
it appears that in this representation, funds from past periods and 
anticipated funds from future periods both have an effect on total loans 
at time t. 
For this representation bank 1 has 18 of 1'9 significant coefficients 
positive, while bank 2 has 22 of 23 significant coefficients positive. 
This indicates that for both banks, the long-term component of other 
time deposits stays within the total loan category for longer than one 
week's time. Comparing these results to those of the OTD on TL repre-
sentation for the LGAM model, shows that both models give the same 
results, i.e., both the long-term component and the total of the change 
in other time deposits stay within the total loan category for longer 
than one week. For banks 1 and 2, there is a strong positive relationship 
between other time deposits, regardless of how they are measured, and 
total loans. 
The results for this representation for bank 3 show that 12 of 21 
significant coefficients are positive. Comparing this representation for 
this model to the OTD on TL representation for the LGAM model indicates 
that for bank 3 the long-term component of other time deposits is much 
more strongly related to total loans than is the total category of other 
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time deposits. No clear interpretation can be given for this representa-
tion of the LCAM model because of the near equality of the numbers of 
positive and negative coefficients and because neither the positive or 
negative coefficients follow a specific pattern. 
Bank 4 has 22 of 24 significant coefficients negative. This 
implies that funds from the long-term component of other time deposits 
do not stay within the total loan category for very long or that funds 
from the long-term component flow into the total loans category on a 
lagged basis, i.e., they flow from the long term component of OTD into 
total loans after some positive time period. These results are just 
opposite of those found for the OTD on TL representation of the LGAM 
model. For bank 4, the total other time deposit category is positively 
correlated with total loans while the long-term component of other time 
deposits is negatively correlated with total loans. 
Also, for bank 4 all the coefficients for this representation 
of the model are significant. This implies that a longer lag might 
be more appropriate for this representation of this bank for this 
model. 
The Long Term Component of Savings Deposits on Total Loans. For 
this representation all four banks have both significant lead and lag 
coefficients. The significant lead coefficients are not anticipated, the 
significant lag coefficients were anticipated. An explanation for this 
existence of both significant lead and lag coefficients is given in the 
preceeding representation of this model. 
Banks 1 and 3 for this representation have 13 of 22 and 10 of 22 
significant coefficients negative, respectively. Since neither the 
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positive or the negative significant coefficients dominate the other and 
since neither the positive or the negative significant coefficients 
exhibit any clear pattern or sequence, no interpretation of this repre-
sentation for these two banks is given. 
Bank 2 has 22 of 23 significant coefficients positive. This indi-
cates that for bank 2 the long-term component of savings deposits stays 
within the total loan category for longer than one week. Also, it 
indicates a strong positive correlation between the long-term component 
of savings deposits and total loans. 
Bank 4 has 22 of 24 significant coefficients negative. This implies 
that for bank 4 funds from the long-term component of other time deposits 
are negatively correlated with total loans. Also, it implies that funds 
flowing into the bank through the long-term component of other time 
deposits do not go immediately into total loans. Or, if they do go 
immediately into total loans, they do not stay within total loans for a 
very long period of time. 
The Long Term Component of Total Savings and Other Time Deposits 
on Total Loans. For this representation of the model only three of the 
banks have both significant lead and lag coefficients. The significant 
lag coefficients were expected. The significant lead coefficients were 
not. An explanation for the existence of both the significant lead and 
lag coefficients is given in the OTDL on TL representation of this model. 
Bank 1 has five of seven significant coefficients negative. Even 
with the majority of coefficients negative, however, total loans will 
probably be positively correlated with the long-term component for total 
savings and other time deposits because of a very large, relative to the 
other coefficients, positive coefficient at time 0. Given the small 
number of significant coefficients and the dominance of one of the 
coefficients over the other six, no explanation of the coefficient 
patterns will be given for bank 1. 
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Bank 2 has only one significant coefficient which occurs at time 
0. Since the coefficient is positive, this indicates that total loans 
are positively correlated with the long-term component of total savings 
and other time deposits. 
Bank 3 is similar to bunk 1 in that the majority, nine, of the 
bank's 14 significant coefficients are negative. However, the five· 
positive significant coefficients are considerably larger than the nine 
negative ones. Because of the considerable difference in size between 
the positive and negative coefficients and because there is no specific 
pattern for either the positive or negative coefficients, no explanation 
as to the meaning of the coefficients will be given for bank 3. 
For this representation bank 4 has six of 11 significant coeffi-
cients negative. Since there is no specific pattern or sequence to the 
coefficients no explanation is given for the relationship between total 
loans and the long-term component of other time deposits. 
The Long Term Component of Total Net Demand, Savings and Other Time 
Deposits on Total Loans. For this representation, banks 1 and 3 have 
both~~nificant lead and lag coefficients. Bank 4 has only signifi-
cant lead coefficients. The significant lead coefficients were not 
anticipated. The significant lag coefficients were anticipated. An 
explanation for the existence of both the significant lead and lag 
coefficients is given in' the OTDL on TL representation of this model. 
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Banks 1 and 3 have four of seven and four of five significant 
coefficients negative, respectively. However, the significant coeffi~ 
cients for both banks are dominated by a large positive coefficient at 
time 0. Since there are so few significant coefficients for each bank 
and because one coefficients seems to dominate the others, no explanation 
is given about the relationship between the long-term component of total 
net demand, savings and other time deposits and total loans. 
Bank 2 has only one significant coefficient which occurs at time 
0. The coefficient is positive, indicating that for bank 2 total 
loans are positively correlated with the long-term component of total 
net demand, savings and other time deposits. 
Bank 4 has a significant coefficient at time 0 and three signifi-
cant lead coefficients. Two of the four significant coefficients are 
negative. There is a large positive coefficient at time 0 which dominates 
the other three. As with banks 1 and 3 for this representation, no 
attempt is made to explain the relationship between the long-term 
component of total deposits and total loans because of the lack of a 
specific pattern in the significant coefficients and the small number 
of significant coefficients. 
The Long Term Component of Other Time Deposits on Other Securities. 
Banks 1, 2, and 3 have significant lead and lag coefficients. Bank 4 
has only one significant lead coefficient and no significant lag coeffi-
cients. The significant lag coefficients were anticipated. The 
significant lead coefficients were not. An explanation of both the 
significant lead and lag coefficients is given in the OTDL on TL 
representation of this model. 
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Bank 1, for this representation, has 22 of 24 significant coeffi-
cients positive. This imdicates a positive correlation between the long-
term component of other time deposits and other securities. It also 
shows that funds from the long-term component of other time deposits go 
directly into other securities and remain there for a period of time 
greater than one week. For this bank the majority of the funds provided 
to other securities from the long-term component of other time deposits 
came from the current period, i.e., time 0. Comparing these results to 
the OTD on OS representation of the LGAM shows that it is the long-term 
component of other time deposits and not the total other time deposits 
category which relates most closely to other securities for this bank. 
Banks 2, 3, and 4 for this representation are similar in that all 
three have a small number of significant coefficients and all three have 
large dominate positive coefficients at time 0, i.e., coefficients which 
are much larger than any of the other coefficients. Banks 2, 3, and 4 
have six, five and two significant coefficients, respectively. The 
large positive coefficient at time 0 for the three banks, indicates that 
there is a positive correlation between the long-term component of other 
time deposits and other securities and that the majority of the funds 
which flow from the long-term component of other time deposits to other 
securities comes from the current period. Taking these results and 
comparing them to the OTD on OS representation of the LGAM shows that 
total other time deposits are also positively correlated to other 
securities and that the funds flow between the total other time deposit 
category and other securities is not dominated by one time period, but 
it fairly evenly spread over several time periods. 
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The Long Term Component of Savings Deposits on Other Securities. 
Each of the four banks has both significant lead and lag coefficients. 
As with previous representations the significant lag coefficients were 
expected and the significant lead coefficients were not. See the OTDL 
on TL representation of this model for an explanation of the existence 
of both significant lead and lag coefficients. 
Bank 1 has 11 of 21 significant coefficients positive. Of the 21 
significant coefficients, the one in time period 0 is by far the largest. 
The large positive coefficient in time period 0 does not, however, 
dominate the remaining significant coefficients as have the larger 
coefficients in other representations. Since the significant coefficients 
are almost evenly split between positive and negative and since they 
follow no specific pattern, no meaningful interpretation of these results 
for bank 1 exists. 
Banks 2 and 4 for this representation produce similar results. Both 
have all but one of their significant coefficients negative. However, the 
one positive significant coefficient is larger than the summation of all 
the significant negative coefficients. This one positive coefficient 
occurs at time 0 for both banks. These results imply that for both banks 
a large portion of the funds flowing into the bank at time 0 through the 
long-term component of savings deposits goes directly into other 
securities. Funds coming into the bank with a lead or a lag through the 
long-term component of savings deposits are negatively correlated with 
other securities and do not go immediately into other securities. 
Bank 3 produces results very similar to banks 2 and 4 except that 
the one positive coefficient at time 0 is not larger than the summation 
of all the negative significant coefficients. The interpretation of the 
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results is also very similar to banks 2 and 4. Funds from the long term 
component of savings deposits in the current period go directly into 
other securities while funds from preceeding and future periods do not 
go directly into other securities. 
The Long Term Component of Total Savings and Other Time Deposits on 
Other Securities. For this representation the only bank that has a 
significant lead or lag coefficient is bank 1. All four banks have 
significant coefficients at time 0, while bank 1 has one significant 
lead coefficient. Each of the four coefficients which occur at time 0 
are positive, indicating that a positive condition exists between the 
long-term component of total savings and other time deposits and other 
securities for all four banks. These results also imply that a portion 
of the funds from the long-term component flows directly into the other 
securities category. 
The Long Term Component of Total Net Demand, Savings and Other Time 
Deposits on Other Securities. Only banks 1 and 2 for this representation 
have significant coefficients. Each bank has only one significant 
coefficient at time 0. Both of the significant coefficients are positive. 
This indicates that for both banks funds coming into the bank through the 
long-term component of total deposits go directly into other securities. 
Noting that total deposits include savings and other time deposits this 
result could be a reflection of the results reported in the TSTL on OS 
representation of this model. 
All of the coefficients for banks 3 and 4 are insignificant. This 
indicates that for banks 3 and 4 there is no relationship between the 
long-term component of total deposits and other securities. 
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The Long Term Component of Net Demand Deposits on Total Loans. All 
four banks for this representation have both significant lead and lag 
coefficients. The significant lag coefficients were anticipated. The 
significant lead coefficients were not. As with previous representations, 
the explanation for both significant lead and lag coefficients is given 
in the OTDL on TL representation of this model. 
Banks 1 and 2 for this representation provide similar results. 
Bank 1 has 18 of 22 significant coefficients negative and bank 2 has 
21 of 23 significant coefficients negative. The results for both banks 
indicate that the long-term component of net demand deposits is negatively 
correlated with total loans. This implies that funds from the long-term 
component do not go immediately into the total loans category; or if 
they do go immediately into total loans they do not remain within the 
total loan category for more than one week's time. 
Bank 3 has six of nine significant coefficients positive. This 
indicates that for this bank the long-term component of net demand 
deposits is positively correlated with total loans. The positive 
condition indicates that some of the funds flowing into the bank through 
the long-term component go directly into total loans and remain there 
for a significant period of time. 
Bank 4 has 19 of 22 significant coefficients negative. Bank 4 is 
differentiated from banks 1 and 2 in that at time 0 bank 4 has a very 
large positive coefficient. This one coefficient is larger than the 
summation of all the negative coefficients for this bank. These results 
imply three things. First, funds coming into the bank at time 0 from 
.the long-term component of net demand deposits go directly into total 
loans. Second, that funds which have come into the bank through the 
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long-term component in previous periods are flowing out of total loans. 
Third, funds from future periods are not expected to go directly into 
total loans. 
The Long Term Component of Net Demand Deposits on Other Securities. 
Each of the four banks for this representation have both significant 
lead and lag coefficients. The significant lag coefficients were 
anticipated. The significant lead coefficients were not anticipated. 
An explanation for the existence of the significant lead and lag 
coefficients is given in the OTDL on TL representation of this model. 
Banks 1, 2, and 3 produce similar results. Bank 1 has 19 of 23 
significant coefficients negative. Bank 2 has 21 of 24 significant 
coefficients negative. Bank 3 has nine of 12 significant coefficients 
negative. These results indicate a negative correlation between the 
long-term component of net demand deposits and other securities. They 
also indicate that for these three banks, funds from the long term 
component go directly into other securities but do not stay within the 
other securities category for more than two weeks. 
Bank 4 has 13 of 16 significant coefficients negative. It does, 
however, have one large positive coefficient at time 0. The coefficient 
at time 0 is larger than the summation of all of the 13 negative 
coefficients. The results for the bank can be interpreted the same as 
the results for banks 1, 2, and 3. 
Conclusions from the LCAM. SAVDL on TLL is the only representation 
of this model which is bank dependent, i.e., the results for this 
representation are different for each bank. All of the other representa-
tions have similar results across some of the banks. In some cases the 
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same results appear in more than one representation. This observation 
holds true for those representations which use some form of total 
liabilities, i.e., a summation of the individual liability categories, 
as the source of funds. 
Summary for the Heuristic Stochastic Models 
The results from the five heuristic stochastic models yield the 
following: 
A. It was originally hypothesized that the five models would have 
no significant lead coefficients. The results for all five 
of the models contain significant lead coefficients. The 
handling of the lead coefficients will be explained in the 
next section of this chapter. 
B. It was originally hypothesized for all five models that no 
lagged relationship existed between the dependent and independent 
variables. The results for all five models contain significant 
lag coefficients for almost every representation. All of the 
significant lag coefficients are for 12 periods or less. 
This result answers the first question posed in Chapter III. 
Is there a lagged relationship between deposit sources and 
asset uses, and if so, what is that relationship? 
C. It was originally hypothesized that the bank asset adjustment 
process would follow one of the five relationships set forth in 
the five models. To determine which of the five models, i.e., 
relationships, best specifies the asset adjustment process will 
require further work. This additional work is outlined in 
Chapter IV and explained in the next section of this chapter. 
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The following, however, can be determined from the results 
examined so far. Given the definition of funds as cash, i.e., coin 
and currency, it is obvious that the banks do not create a pool of 
cash from which monies are drawn for investment purposes. This 
eliminates the SFM as a viable alternative for explaining the bank 
asset adjustment process. Since the SFM is eliminated, equations 
(7) and (14) in Chapter III can not exist. This result implies that 
the SGAM and the SCAM will be the models which best explain the 
adjustments in the banks' short-term asset categories. This further 
implies that the LGAM and/or the LCAM will be the models which best 
explain the ?djustments in the banks' long-term asset categories. 
The next section of this chapter will present the results which 
indicate which is the better of the two long-term models. 
The Root Mean Square Error for The 
Heuristic and Optimization Models 
The purpose of this study is to compare the predictive abilities of 
three different models of the adjustment process for a bank's asset 
portfolio. The best way to compare the predictive abilities for 
different models is to measure how closely the predicted values for each 
model came to the actual values the model is trying to predict. An 
appropriate measure for comparing predicted to actual values is the 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE). 5 
Since the RMSE uses the squared difference between the actual and 
predicted values, the lower the RMSE the better. Therefore, whenever 
5 This measure is defined and explained in Chapter IV. 
118 
·a reference is made to the "best" representation for a particular asset 
category, the term "best" means that representation with the lowest RMSE. 
The RMSE for the Heuristic Models 
In determining the predicted values for the Heuristic models for .all 
of the banks, the significant lead coefficients in each representation 
are omitted because at time t the bank does not know the amount of 
deposits it will have in a particular deposit category at time t+N. 
Thus, even though the coefficients are known the bank could not know 
the change in any of the deposit categories in any of the t+N periods. 
The bank can know that the change in a particular asset category will 
depend upon changes in future deposit categories, but it is improbable 
that the bank could predict with any degree of accuracy the precise 
effect the future changes in deposits will have on the current change 
in assets. For this reason the significant lead coefficienfs were 
omitted in determining the predicted changes in the asset categories 
for the Heuristic models. 
For each bank, i.e., l; 2, 3, and 4, and for each asset category, 
i.e., coin and currency, treasury securities, other securities and 
total loans, several representations of each bank asset category combina-
6 tion were studied. The RMSEs for each representation of each model are 
presented by bank and asset category in Tables XXIII through XXXVIII. 
The results of the Heuristic models for bank 1 are in Tables XXIII through 
6 A list of representations by asset category is presented in Table 
XXII. The asset categories and their representations are the same for 
each bank. 
TABLE XXII 
A LISTING OF THE REPRESENTATIONS FOR THE ASSET CATEGORIES 
Coin and Currency Treasury Securities Other Securities Total Loans 
1 NDD on CC 1 NDD on TS 1 OTD on OS 1 OTD on TL 
2 SAVD on CC 2 SAVD on TS 2 TST on OS 2 TST on TL 
3 TNS on CC 3 TNS on TS 3 NDDL on OS 3 NDDL on TL 
4 NDDS on CC 4 NDDS on TS 4 SAVDL on OS 4 SAVDL on TL 
5 SAVDS on CC 5 SAVDS on TS 5 OTDL on OS 5 OTDL on TL 
6 OTDS on cc 6 OTDS on TS 6 TSTL on OS 6 TSTL on TL 
7 TNSS on cc 7 TNSS on TS 7 TNSTL on OS 7 TNSTL on TL 
8 TNTS on cc 8 TSTS on TS 
9 TNSTS on CC 9 TNSTS on TS 
TABLE XXIII 












* Lowest RMSE. 
Name 
NDD on CC 
SAVD on CC 
TNS on CC 
NDDS on CC 
SAVDS on CC 
OTDS on CC 
TNSS on CC 
TNTS on CC 
TNSTS on CC 
TABLE XXIV 












*Lowest RMS E. 
Name 
NDD on TS 
SAVD on TS 
TNS on TS . 
NDDS on TS 
SAVDS on TS 
OTDS on TS 
TNSS on TS 
TSTS on TS 
























ASSET CATEGORY: OTHER SECURITIES, BANK 1 
Re:eresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on OS 18193* 
2 TST on OS 19429 
3 NDDL on OS 887906 
4 SAVDL on OS 957793 
5 OTDL on OS 4473527 
6 TSTL on OS 3450926 
7 TNSTL on OS 810295 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXVI 
ASSET CATEGORY: TOTAL LOANS, BANK 1 
Re:eresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on TL 22461 
2 TST on TL 20842* 
3 NDDL on TL 3878645 
4 SAVDL on TL 3449058 
5 OTDL on TL 5149887 
6 TSTL on TL 4420080 
7 TNSTL on TL 3999833 
* Lowest RMSE. 
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XXVI. The results of the Heuristic models for bank 2 are in Tables 
XXVII through XXX. The RMSE results for bank 3 can be found in Tables 
XXXI through XXXIV. The results of the Heuristic models for bank 4 
are in Tables XXXV through XXXVIII. 
The RMSEs for the Heuristic Models of Bank 1. For bank 1, the 
RMSEs for the various representations of the SGAM and SCAM for the coin 
and currency category are shown in Table XXIII. In Table XXIII the 
first three representations are of the SGAM and the last six representa-
tions are of the SCAM. For the coin and currency category for bank 1, 
it is an SGAM representation, SAVD on CC, which yields the lowest RMSE. 
This implies that for the coin and currency category of bank 1 a form 
of the SGAM is the best model. Even though this form of the SGAM yields 
the lowest RMSE for this bank and asset category, it is still not an 
accurate predictor of the change in coin and currency. This is because 
the RMSE for this representation is large relative to the actual changes 
in coin and currency for bank 1. 
The RMSEs for the treasury security category of bank 1 are displayed 
in Table XXIV. The first three representations are forms of the SGAM and 
the last six are forms of the SCAM. For the treasury security category 
for bank 1 it is an SCAM representation, OTDS on TS, which yields the 
minimum RMSE. These results indicate that for this asset category and 
bank the short term component of other time deposits, a form of the 
SCAM, is the best representation. The RMSE of this representation is 
also large relative to the actual changes in treasury securities for 
this bank. 
The RMSEs for the other securities category for bank 1 are shown in 
Table XXV. In this case, the first two representations are forms of the 
123 
LGAM and the last five are forms of the LCAM. For this asset category 
it is an LGAM representation, OTD on OS, which gives the lowest RMSE. 
these results indicate that for this bank and asset category it is a 
form of the LGAM which is the best representation. This representation 
provides a better estimate of the actual changes in other securities 
than did the representations with the minimum RMSE for cbin and currency 
and treasury securities. 
Finally, for bank 1, the RMSEs for the asset category total loans 
are shown in Table XXVI. The first two representations are of the LGAM 
and the last five are of the LCAM. For total loans in bank 1, it is an 
LGAM representation, TST on TL, which provides the smallest RMSE. The 
RMSEs show that for this bank and asset category that· a form of the 
LGAM is the best representation. As with other securities, the repre-
sentation providing the minimum RMSE for the total loan category provides 
a better estimate of the actual total loans held by this bank than did 
the best representations with the coin and currency and treasury security 
categories. 
In summation for bank 1, two points can be made. First, three of 
the four best representations are a form of the group allocation models, 
i.e., those for coin and currency, other securities and total loans. 
The implication is that bank 1 tends to allocate funds to various asset 
categories more by the total amount of change in a particular deposit 
category than by a change in the short- or long-run component of a 
particular deposit category. Second, the long-term asset categories, 
i.e., other securities and total loans, are more accurately predicted 
for this bank than are the short-term categories, i.e., coin and 
currency and treasury securities. 
The RMSEs for the Heuristic Models of Bank 2. The RMSEs for the 
coin and currency category of bank 2 are shown in Table XXVII. The 
first three representations are of the SGAM and the last six are of 
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the SCAM. For this asset category and bank it is an SCAM representation, 
NODS on CC, which gives the minimum RMSE. This means that for this 
asset category and bank a form of the SCAM is the best model. As with 
the same asset category for bank 1, this model did not predict very 
accurately the actual changes in coin and currency for this bank. 
For the treasury securities category of bank 2, the RMSEs are 
presented in Table XXVIII. The first three representations in the table 
are forms of the SGAM while the last six are forms of the SCAM. For 
this asset category and bank it is an SCAM representation, TSTS on TS, 
which has the lowest RMSE. These results indicate that for this bank 
and asset category, it is a form of the SCAM that is the best representa-
tion. This model does predict more accurately for this bank than does 
the model with the minimum RMSE for this asset category for bank 1. 
The RMSEs for the other securities category of bank 2 are displayed 
in Table XXIX. The first two representations are forms of the LGAM while 
the next five are representations of the LCAM. It is an LGAM representa-
tion which has the smallest RMSE for the bank and asset category. These 
results indicate that for this bank and asset.category a form of the 
LGAM, OTD on OS, is the best representation. This model, with the 
lowest RMSE, is a more accurate predictor of the actual change in other 
securities than were the models with the lowest RMSE for coin and 
currency and treasury securities. 
The RMSEs for the total loan category for bank 2 are shown in 
Table XXX. The first two representations are of the LGAM and the last 
TABLE XXVII 














NDD on CC 
SAVD on CC 
TNS on CC 
NDDS on CC 
SAVDS on CC 
OTDS on CC 
TNSS on CC 
TNTS on CC 
TNSTS on CC 
TABLE XXVIII 












· *Lowest RMS E. 
Name 
NDD on TS 
SAVD on TS 
TNS on TS 
NDDS on TS 
SAVDS on TS 
OTDS on TS 
TNSS on TS 
TSTS on TS 































ASSET CATEGORY: OTHER SECURITIES, BANK 2 
Representation 
Name 
OTD on OS 
TST on OS 
NDDL on OS 
SAVDL on OS 
OTDL on OS 
TSTL on OS 
TNSTL on OS 
*Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXX 
ASSET CATEGORY: TOTAL LOANS, BANK 2 
Re~resentation 
Number Name 
1 OTD on TL 
2 TST on TL 
3 NDDL on TL 
4 SAVDL on TL 
5 OTDL on TL 
6 TSTL on TL 
7 TNSTL on TL 



















five are of the LCAM. It is a:n LCAM representation, SAVDL on TL, which· 
gives the minimum RMSE for this asset category and bank. This indicates 
th~t a form of the LCAM is the best representation for total loans for 
this bank. As with bank 1, this model is a more accurate predictor of 
total loans than are the models with the lowest RMSEs for the coin and 
currency and treasury securities categories. 
In summation for bank 2, two points can again be made. First, 
three of the four best representations are a form of the component allo-
cation model, i.e., those for coin and currency, treasury securities 
and total loans. The implication is that bank 2 tends to allocate 
funds to various asset categories based upon the change in the short-
term or long-term component of a particular deposit category. Second, 
as with bank 1, the long-term asset categories, i.e., other securities 
and total loans, are more accurately predicted for this bank than are 
the short-term asset categories, i.e., coin and currency and treasury 
securities. 
The RMSEs for the Heuristic Model of Bank 3. For the coin and 
currency category of bank 3, RMSEs are presented in Table XXXI. The 
first three representations are of the SGAM and the last six are of the 
SCAM. For this bank and asset category it is an SCAM representation, 
TNSTS on CC, which has the smallest RMSE. This implies that for this 
bank and asset category a form of the SCAM is the best model. As with 
the previous two banks, this model was not a very accurate predictor of 
the change in the coin and currency account. 
The RMSEs for the treasury security category of bank 3 are shown in 
Table XXXII. The first three representations are of the SGAM and the 
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TABLE XXXI 
ASSET CATEGORY: COIN AND CURRENCY, BANK 3 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 NDD on CC 821 
2 SAVD on CC 863 
3 TNS on CC 4923 
4 NDDS on CC 862 
5 SAVDS on CC 991 
6 OTDS on cc 784 
7 TNSS on CC 786 
8 TNTS on CC 882 
9 TNSTS on CC 769* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXXII 
ASSET CATEGORY: TREASURY SECURITIES, BANK 3 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 NDD on TS 7688 
2 SAVD on TS 8380 
3 TNS on TS 37815 
4 NDDS on TS 7973 
5 SAVDS on TS 9836 
6 OTDS on TS 30265 
7 TNSS on TS 11960 
8 TSTS on TS 11478 
9 TNSTS on TS 7653* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
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TABLE XXXIII 
ASSET CATEGORY: OTHER SECURITIES, BANK 3 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on OS 11010 
2 TST on OS 28717 
3 NDDL on OS 63564 
4 SAVDL on OS 66241 
5 OTDL on OS 16586 
6 TSTL on OS 42408 
7 TNSTL on OS 11009* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXXIV 
ASSET CATEGORY: TOTAL LOANS, BANK 3 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on TL 1490* 
2 TST on TL 1490* 
3 NDDL on TL 372500 
4 SAVDL on TL 84162 
5 OTDL on TL 158676 
6 TSTL on TL 301695 
7 TNSTL on TL 301621 
* Lowest RMSE. 
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last six representations are of the SCAM. The findings indicate that 
it is an SCAM, TNSTS on TS, which yields the lowest RMSE. This means 
th~t for this bank and asset category, a representation of the SCAM is 
the best model. For this bank this model appears to be the least 
accurate predictor of the actual values of the four asset categories 
predicted. 
The RMSEs for the other securities category for this bank are 
displayed in Table XXXIII. The first two representations are of the 
LGAM, the last five are of the LCAM. For this bank and asset category 
it is an LCAM representation, TNSTL on OS, which has the minimum RMSE. 
This means that for this bank and asset category a form of the LCAM is 
the best model. This model, while not extremely accurate at predicting 
the actual change in other securities, is more accurate than the models 
for the coin and currency and treasury security categories. 
The RMSEs for the total loan category for this bank are shown in 
Table XXXIV. The first two representations are for the LGAM and the 
last five are for the LCAM. Two LGAM representations for this model, 
OTD on TL and TST on TL, given the lowest RMSE for this bank and asset 
category. These results indicate that for this bank and asset category 
two forms of the LGAM are the best models. These two forms of the LGAM 
give the most accurate predictions of the actual changes in this asset 
category relative to the other models' predictions for the changes in 
the other three asset categories of bank 3. 
In swmnation for bank 3, three results need to be emphasized. First, 
as with the previous two banks, the long-term asset categories, i.e., 
total loans and other securities, are more accurately predicted than are 
the short-term categories, i.e., coin and currency and treasury securities. 
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Second, three of the four best representations are forms of the component 
allocation model. These are coin and currency, treasury securities, and 
other securities. 7 This indicates that bank 3 tends to allocate funds 
from its deposit categories on the basis of the long- and short-term 
components of those deposit categories. Third, the deposit category 
whose short- or long-term component is the best predictor in all three 
of the above cases is total net demand, savings and time deposits. 
Apparently bank 3 allocated funds to asset categories not from specific 
deposit categories but from the components of their total deposits. 
The RMSEs for the Heuristic Models of Bank 4. The RMSEs for the 
coin and currency category for this bank are shown in Table XXXV. The 
first three representations are of the SGAM, the last six representations 
are for the SCAM. The findings indicate that it is an SGAM representa-
tion, NDD on CC, which has the lowest RMSE. This model predicts the 
change in coin and currency more accurately than any of the models for 
coin and currency for the preceeding three banks. This particular repre-
sentation for this bank is still only moderately accurate in predicting 
the actual changes in coin and currency. 
The RMSEs for the treasury security category are presented in Table 
XXXVI. The first three representations are of the SGAM and the last six 
are of the SCAM. For this bank and asset category it is an SGAM, SAVD on 
TS, which has the lowest RMSE. This means that for this asset category 
7There is a very close second best representation. This second 
best representation is an LGAM, OTD on OS. This implies that this bank 
could be using either the long-term component of total deposits or the 
OTD category to predict total loans. 
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TABLE XXXV 
ASSET CATEGORY: COIN AND CURRENCY, BANK 4 
Re12resentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 NDD on CC 339* 
2 SAVD on CC 388 
3 TNS on CC 594 
4 NDDS on CC 563 
5 SAVDS on CC 1861 
6 OTDS on cc 362 
7 TNSS on CC 374 
8 TNTS on CC 8135 
9 TNSTS on CC 930 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXXVI 
ASSET CATEGORY: TREASURY SECURITIES, BANK 4 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 NDD on TS 1923 
2 SAVD on TS 18531~ 
3 TNS on TS 53914 
4 NDDS on TS 7621 
5 SAVDS on TS 13325 
6 OTDS on TS 6455 
7 TNSS on TS 46374 
8 TSTS on TS 5532 
9 TNSTS on TS 6377 




ASSET CATEGORY: OTHER SECURITIES, BANK 4 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on OS 1541 
2 TST on OS 41660 
3 NDDL on OS 88246 
4 SAVDL on OS 89829 
5 OTDL on OS 86342 
6 TSTL on OS 43163 
7 TNSTL on OS 1538* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XXXVIII 
ASSET CATEGORY: TOTAL LOANS, BANK 4 
ReEresentation 
Number Name RMSE 
1 OTD on TL 2361)'c 
2 TST on TL 286938 
3 NDDL on TL 440199 
4 SAVDL on TL 451801 
5 OTDL on TL 437688 
6 TSTL on TL 286418 
7 TNSTL on TL 290475 
* Lowest RMSE. 
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and bank a form of the SGAM is the best model. As with all three other 
banks, this model was not an accurate predictor of the change in 
treasury securities. 
The other securities category for bank 4 is shown in Table XXXVII. 
The first two representations are of the LGAM, the last five are of the 
LCAM. The results indicate that it is an LCAM, TNSTL on OS, which 
provides the lowest RMSE. This means that for this bank and asset 
category the LCAM appears to be the best model. While still a more 
accurate predictor than the models for the short-term asset categories, 
this model is ~lao the most inaccurate for the four banks at predicting 
the change in other securities. 
The RMSEs for the total loan category of bank 4 are displayed in 
Table XXXVIII. The first two representations are of the LGAM while the 
last five are for the LCAM. For this bank and asset category it is an 
LGAM, OTD, on TL, which gives the minimum RMSE. This result means that 
it is a form of the LGAM which is the best model for this bank and asset 
category. As with the previous banks, this model for predicting the 
change in total loans is more accurate than the models for predicting 
the changes in the coin and currency and treasury securities categories 
for bank 4. 
For bank 4, two conclusions can be stated. First, three of the 
four asset categories, i.e., coin and currency, treasury securities 
and total loans, have a form of the group allocation model as their 
best model. This implies that for this bank, funds are allocated to the 
asset categories on the basis of the total amount of change in a parti-
cular deposit category. Second, as with the previous three banks, the 
models for the long-term asset categories, i.e., other securities and 
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total loans, were better predictors of the actual changes in the asset 
categories than were the models for the short-term asset categories, 
i.e., coin and currency and treasury securities, 
The RMSEs for the Optimization ModelG 
The results for the two optimization models are presented in this 
section; first the results from the linear programming model and then 
the results from the quadratic programming model. 
The RMSEs for the Linear Programming Model. The RMSEs for the 
linear programming model are shown in Tables XXIX and XL. The first 
table displays the results by asset category for banks 1 and 2. The 
second table presents the results by asset category for banks 3 and 4. 
As with the Heuristic models, the linear programming model gives more 
accurate predictions for the long-term, i.e., other securities and 
total loans, asset categories than for the short-term categories. The 
one exception is the total loans category for bank 2. The linear pro-
gramming model gives the least accurate predictions for this bank and 
asset category. Over all, the linear programming model is not a very 
accurate predictor of bank behavior. 
The RMSEs for the Quadratic Programming Model. The RMSEs for the 
quadratic programming model are shown in Tables XLI and XLII. Table XLI 
displays the results by asset category for banks 1 and 2. Table XLI 
displays the results by asset category for banks 3 and 4. The results 
for the quadratic programming model are different from the results of 
the Heuristic and linear programming models. The quadratic programming 
model yields the best results for the short-term asset categories, i.e., 
TABLE XXXIX 
RMSE BY ASSET CATEGORY AND BANK FOR THE 
LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL, BANKS 1 AND 2 
Category 
Bank 1: 










RMSE BY ASSET CATEGORY AND BANK FOR THE 
LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL, BANKS 3 AND 4 
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RMSE BY ASSET CATEGORY AND BANK FOR THE QUADRATIC 
PROGRAMMING MODEL, BANKS 1 AND 2 
Category 
Bank 1: 










RMSE BY ASSET CATEGORY AND BANK FOR THE QUADRATIC 
PROGRAMMING MODEL, BANKS 3 AND 4 
Category 
Bank 3: 




























coin and currency and treasury securities, and the other securities 
category. This holds true for banks 1, 2, and 3. Bank 4 is the only 
exception, and this is because the quadratic model predicts so poorly 
for the treasury securities category. 
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The quadratic programming model is the least accurate predictor of 
the total loans category for banks 1, 2, and 3. This result differs 
markedly from the Heuristic and linear programming models. This model 
is, however, the best predictor of total loans for bank 4. The results 
for this model, as with the previous models, are bank and asset category 
dependent. The quadratic programming model does appear to best predict 
the short-term asset categories, but it is a very poor predictor of the 
total loans category. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study is to compare the predictive abilities of 
different, i.e., heuristic and optimization, models of the adjustment 
process for a bank's asset portfolio. The research revealed that the 
heuristic models were the most accurate predictors for all four bank's 
portfolio adjustment processes. The analysis also indicated that for the 
four banks studied the way in which funds flow into particular asset 
categories is very much bank and asset category dependent. This means 
that for these four banks there is not a uniform way in which funds flow 
into particular asset categories. There is not even a uniform flow 
within a particular bank. These results indicate that there is no one 
correct approach, i.e., asset allocation, pool-of-funds, etc., which 
describes how funds flow into a bank's asset categories. 
The nature of this study is descriptive, not normative. It presents 
the behavior of four banks as analyzed by the models used. The results 
of this study do not mean that all banks behave in a manner similar to 
the four studied. Nor are the models used to study the banks all 
inclusive. It is hoped that the results of this research, while not all 




Overview of the Study 
The models of bank behavior and their underlying ideas are presented 
in Chapters I and II. None of the studies presented in Chapter II, 
however, have compared the predictive abilities of the different models 
of bank behavior. Based on a desire to compare the predictive abilities 
of the various models of bank behavior, the following null and alter-
native hypotheses were formulated. 
Hypothesis No. 1 
H0 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a long-term 
maturity will not be placed into asset categories which have a long-term 
maturity. 
H1 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a long-term 
maturity will be placed into asset categories which have a long-term 
maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 2 
H0 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a short-term 
maturity will not be placed into asset categories which have a short-
term maturity. 
H1 : Funds which flow into the bank as deposits with a short-term 
maturity will be placed into asset categories which have a short-term 
maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 3 
H0 : All funds flowing into the bank as deposits will be placed 
into asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
H1 : All funds flowing into the bank as deposits will not be 
placed into asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 4 
H0 : The transitory component of the short-term deposits and/or 
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the transitory component of the long-term deposits will not be allocated 
to asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
H1 : The transitory component of the short-term deposits and/or 
the transitory component of the long-term deposits will be allocated 
to asset categories which have a short-term maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 5 
H0 : The permanent component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
permanent component of the long-term deposits will not be allocated to 
asset categories which have a long-term maturity. 
H1 : The permanent component of the short-term deposits and/or the 
permanent component of the long-term deposits will be allocated to asset 
categories which have a long-term maturity. 
Hypothesis No. 6 
H0 : A bank will adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
maximize bank profits. It will make the adjustments restricted by legal, 
regulatory and managerial constraints. 
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H1 : A bank will not adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
maximize bank profits. It will make the adjustments restricted by legal, 
r~gulatory and managerial constraints. 
Hypothesis No. 7 
H0 : A bank adjusts its asset portfolio in such a way as to minimize 
its risk for a given level of return or maximize its return for a given 
level of risk. 
H1 : A bank will not adjust its asset portfolio in such a way as to 
minimize its risk for a given level of return or maximize its return for 
a given level of risk. 
The methodology of this research was divided into three groups 
according to the model of bank behavior, i.e., heuristic, linear program-
ming, or quadratic programming, being used. The methodology for the 
heuristic models is presented first, followed by the methodology for the 
linear programming and quadratic programming models, respectively. 
The methodology for the heuristic models consisted of first using 
spectral analysis to determine the appropriate lead-lag structure. This 
was accomplished by comparing gain and phase diagrams for known lead-lag 
relationships to the gain and phase diagrams found in this study. After 
determining the appropriate lead-lag structure, spectral analysis was 
again used to filter the funds inflows. This allowed the funds inflows 
to be divided into their permanent and transitory components for each 
deposit category. Using the filtered and non-filtered data, depending 
upon the heuristic model being used, Hannan's inefficient method of time· 
series analysis was used to obtain the regression coefficients. The 
regression coefficients were then used to obtain the predicted portfolio 
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values for each bank and asset category. The predicted portfolios and 
the actual portfolios were then used to calculate the Root Mean Square 
Errors for each bank and asset category. 
The methodology for the linear programming model was a bit simplier. 
Using the appropriate constraints, the linear programming model was 
used to generate the percentage of total assets which should be in each 
asset category. The percentages for each bank were then multiplied 
by the total assets for each bank to give the,predicted asset portfolios 
for each bank. Using the predicted and actual asset portfolios, the 
RMSEs for each bank and asset category were calculated. 
The methodology for the quadratic programming was exactly the same 
as that for the linear programming. Quadratic programming was used to 
generate a frontier of minimum risk for a given level of return port-
folios. The variance of the returns for each bank's total asset 
portfolio was calculated and the portfolio on the efficient frontier 
with the closest level of risk was chosen as the optimum risk/return 
portfolio for the bank. This optimum portfolio gave the percentage of 
total assets which should be in each asset category. The percentages 
for each bank were then multiplied by the total assets for each bank 
to get the predicted amounts for each asset category. As before, using 
the predicted and actual amounts for each asset category, the RMSEs for 
each bank were calculated. 
The Research Results 
The Results of the Predictive Abilities of the 
H~uristic, Linear Programming and Quadratic 
Programming Models 
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Table XLIII presents the RMSEs for each bank for each model. The 
heuristic models yield the lowest RMSEs for all four banks using all 
asset categories. The linear programming model gives the second lowest 
RMSEs for all four banks. The quadratic programming model yields the 
largest RMSEs for all four banks. 
These results indicate that the heuristic models are the most 
accurate predictors of all four bank's asset portfolio adjustment process. 
The linear programming model is the second most accurate model, while 
the quadratic programming model is the least accurate. 
Tables XLIV through XLVII show the RMSEs by bank by model for each 
asset category. Table XLIV indicates the results for the coin and 
currency category. The results in Table XLIV show that the heuristic 
model yields the lowest RMSEs for banks 3 and 4. These results also 
indicate that both the linear and the quadratic programming models 
provide the minimum RMSEs for one bank each, i.e., banks 2 and 1, 
respectively. Obviously, which model is the best at predicting the 
banks' coin and currency is not clear cut. 
Table XLV presents the outcome for the treasury securities category. 
The heuristic models present the lowest RMSEs for all four banks for 
this asset category. The quadratic programming model presents the 
second lowest RMSEs for banks 1 and 2, while the linear programming model 
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RMSE BY MODEL, TREASURY 'SECURITIES 
Model 
Bank LP TS QP 
1 24980 20650* 23315 
2 24000 9869* 10745 
3 7880 7653* 8112 
4 3472 1853* 5728 
* Lowest RMSE. 
TABLE XLVI 
RMSE BY MODEL, OTHER SECURITIES 
Model 
Bank LP TS QP 
1 16800 18193 14650* 
2 15000 12479* 12998 
3 10796* 11009 11028 
4 1742 1538* 1538* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
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heuristic models are the best predictors of the treasury securities held 
by all four banks. 
Table XLVI shows the results for the other securities asset category. 
As with the coin and currency category, the results of this category are 
mixed. For banks 2 and 4 the heuristic models provide the smallest RMSEs. 
The linear programming model yields the lowest RMSE for bank 3. The 
quadratic programming model provj.des the lowest RMSEs for banks 1 and 4. 
The heuristic and the quadratic programming models provided the exact 
same RMSE for this category for bank 4. 
Table XLVII gives the results for the total loans category. The 
heuristic models have the lowest RMSEs for banks 1, 2, and 3, and the 
second lowest RMSE, by a very small margin, for bank 4. The linear 
programming model has the second lowest RMSEs for banks 1, 2, and 3. 
The quadratic programming model has the lowest RMSE for bank 4. The 
results for total loans are fairly clear. The heuristic models are the 
best predictors of the total loans category. The linear programming 
model is the second best predictor for this asset category. And 
considering the magnitude of the RMSEs, the quadratic programming model 
is by far the worst predictor of total loans. 
The heuristic models are the best predictors for the treasury 
securities and total loans categories. While the results for coin and 
currency and other securities are mixed, the heuristic models have the 
lowest RMSEs for two of the four banks. Therefore, it is not unexpected 
that the heuristic models should provide the lowest RMSEs for all asset 
categories for all four banks. 
Using the RMSE as a measure of predictability indicates that none 
of the four banks adjust their asset portfolios according to hypotheses 
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six and seven in Chapter III. The results indicate that the null hypo-
thesis for hypotheses six and seven must be rejected and the alternative 
hypotheses accepted, i.e., that the banks do not adjust their asset 
portfolios in order to maximize profits or to minimize a risk per unit 
of return relationship. These results lead to the conclusion that the 
banks adjust their asset portfolios according to the behavior postulated 
by one or more of the first five hypotheses, i.e., those relating to the 
heuristic models, presented in Chapter III. 
TABLE XLVII 
RMSE BY MODEL, TOTAL LOANS 
Model 
Bank LP TS QP 
1 24600 20842* 50524 
2 64200 22953* 80869 
3 2086 1490* 2489 
4 2563 2361 2301* 
* Lowest RMSE. 
The Implications of the Results of the 
Heuristic Models 
Tables XLVIII through LII show those heuristic models by bank and 
asset category which yielded the lowest RMSEs. Tables XLVIII through LI 
indicate the best heuristic models for each bank by asset category. 
Table LII shows the best heuristic models by asset category for all four 
banks. 
Category 










LOWEST ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR 
REPRESENTATION, BANK 1 
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Representation of Model 
With the Lowest RMSE 
SAVD on cc 
OTDS on TS 
OTD on OS 
TST on TL 
TABLE XLIX 
LOWEST ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR 
REPRESENTATION, BANK 2 
Representation of Model 
With the Lowest RMSE 
NDDS on CC 
TSTS on TS 
OTD on OS 
SAVDL on TL 
Category 










LOWEST ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR 
REPRESENTATION, BANK 3 
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Representation of Model 
With the Lowest RMSE 
TNSTS on cc 
TNSTS on TS 
OTD on OS 
OTD on TL 
or 
TST on TL 
TABLE LI 
LOWEST ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR 
REPRESENTATION, BANK 4 
Representation of Model 
With the Lowest RMSE 
NDD on CC 
SAVD on TS 
OTD on OS 







SAVD on cc 
NDDS on cc 
TNSTS on CC 
NOD on CC 
TABLE LII 
RESULTS OF HEURISTIC MODELS BY 
BANK AND ASSET CATEGORY 
Asset Category 
TS OS 
OTDS on TS OTD on OS 
TSTS on TS OTD on OS 
TNSTS on TS OTD on OS 
SAVD on TS OTD on OS 
TL 
TST on TL 
SAVDL on TL 
OTD on TL 
or 
TST on TL 
OTD on TL 
For bank 1, the results shown in Table XLVIII indicate that for 
three of the four asset categories, i.e., coin and currency, other 
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securities and total loans, a form of the group allocation model yielded 
the lowest RMSE. These results show that bank 1 adjusted its asset 
portfolio according to changes in the total liability categories. The 
results for bank 1 indicate that the null hypotheses for hypotheses one, 
two and four should be accepted. The remaining two null hypotheses 
should be rejected and their alternatives accepted. 
Table XLIX presents the results for bank 2. Three of the four 
asset categories make adjustments based on a form of the component 
allocation model. Coin and currency, treasury securities and total 
loans seem to be adjusted on the basis of a change in a short-term or 
long-term component for one of the liability categories. These results 
indicate that for hypotheses one, four and five the null hypothesis 
should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. 
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Table L gives the results for bank 3. Two of the four asset 
categories, i.e., coin and currency and treasury securities, have forms 
of the component allocation model which produce the lowest RMSEs. Two 
of the four asset categories, i.e., other securities and total loans, 
have forms of the group allocation model which produce the lowest RMSEs. 
These results indicate that bank 3 allocates funds to its short-term 
asset categories based upon the short-terrn and long-term components of 
changes in the liability categories. The results also indicate that 
bank 3 allocates funds to its long term asset categories based upon 
changes in the total long-term liability categories. For bank 3, hypo-
theses one and four should be accepted. The remaining null hypotheses 
should be rejected and their alternative hypotheses accepted. 
The results for bank 4 are shown in Table Ll. All four of the 
asset categories, i.e., coin and currency, treasury securities, other 
securities, and total loans, have the lowest RMSEs produced by forms of 
the group allocation model. These findings show that bank 4 allocated 
its funds to its asset categories based upon changes in the total short-
term and long-term liability categories. For this bank the null hypo-
theses one and two should be accepted. The remaining null hypotheses 
should be rejected. 
Table LII summarizes the best heuristic models by asset category. 
The best representations for the treasury securities category indicate 
that for three of the four banks a form of the component allocation 
model is the best. This indicates that banks 1, 2, and 3 allocate funds 
to the treasury securities category based on the short-term component 
of the change in one or more liability categories. 
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The same table shows that for the coin and currency category banks 
2 and 3 allocate based upon forms of the component allocation model, and 
banks 1 and 4 allocate based upon forms of the group allocation model. 
It can therefore be concluded that for the coin and currency category 
there is no definite preference for either, i.e., group or component, 
type of model. 
The other securities and the total loans categories are the remain-
ing asset categories shown in Table LII. For the other securities 
category for all four banks, the best representations are a form of the 
group allocation model. These results indicate that all four banks 
allocate funds to this asset category based upon the changes in the 
total amounts of specific liability categories. 
Almost the same results hold true for the total loans category. 
Three of the four banks, Le., oanks 1, 3 and 4, have forms of the group 
allocation model as their best representation for this asset category. 
These results mean that for the total loans category the majority of 
banks allocate funds based upon changes of the total amounts in a given 
liability category. 
Table LII provides no new information about which hypotheses should 
be accepted or rejected. It simply provides a different format for 
examining the research results. 
These results, while clearly indicating a heuristic, linear pro-
gramming and quadratic programming ordering as far as the predictive 
ability of the three types of models are concerned, also reveal additional 
information. It is clear that the best heuristic model is very asset 
category and bank dependent. There is no one heuristic model whose 
results are consistently the best for all banks and all asset categories. 
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This result implies that of the four banks studied each behaves in its 
own way as regards the adjustment of its asset portfolio. 
Implications of the Study 
This research provides insight into two aspects of bank behavior. 
First, it provides information regarding the predictive abilities of 
various models of bank behavior. Second, the study provides information 
about how the four banks in this study adjust their asset portfolios. 
This study shows that heuristic time series models are the best 
predictors of a bank's asset portfolio adjustment process. The results 
indicate the heuristic models to be more accurate predictors than the 
optimization models studied. The study also shows that the idea .of 
filtering data, i.e., using a permanent or transitory component of the 
change in a particular liability category, does not always provide a 
more accurate prediction of the adjustment process. The implication of 
these findings is that both researchers and bank managers who are trying 
to predict asset portfolio adjustments would do better to model the 
behavior of a particular bank or banks using a heuristic time series 
model of the kind shown in this paper than they would to use either of 
the two optimization techniques studied. 
The study also indicates how funds are transferred within the four 
banks examined. The results of the study show that the pool-of-funds 
concept of asset portfolio adjustment is not prevalent within the four 
banks. The implication being that in future research a pool-of-funds 
behavior could be ignored or given less emphasis than other theories 
of asset portfolio adjustment. 
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The adjustment process found to be the best for each bank and asset 
category varied widely among the four banks and the four asset categories 
for each bank. The implication of this result is that future researchers 
trying to establish heuristic time series models of bank behavior should 
be very careful in generalizing any results found for a particular bank 
or asset category. 
The results of the heuristic models indicated both significant lead 
and lag coefficients. The implication is that the banks adjust their 
asset portfolios according to past deposit inflows as well as expected 
future deposit inflows. Future researchers would do well to incorporate 
the anticipated deposit inflows into their efforts. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
For this study, recommendations will only be made for future studies 
which would compare the predictive abilities of models of bank asset 
portfolio adjustment. 
The recommendations for future research are threefold. First, 
additional optimization models could be used along with linear and 
quadratic programming. Goal programming and/or multiobjective program-
ming might be two optimization methods for future consideration. Also, 
alternative specifications to the linear and quadratic programming models 
used in this study are also possibilities. 
Second, the time series models specified in this study might be 
reformulated. Provided data is available, a mechanism allowing for 
liability management on the part of each bank might help increase the 
predictability of the time series models. A multistage autoregressive 
framework might be more accurate. If the multistage autoregressive 
framework ailowed for a feedback or circular mechanism between the 
banks' asset adjustment and liability management, the accuracy of the 
predictions might be greatly increased. 
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Finally, a study might be conducted under different economic 
conditions than the current study. The April to October 1976 period 
for this study was a relatively stable period for the banking industry. 
Similar studies might be done in periods of large funds inflows and 
outflows for the banking industry. 
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